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Empirische Analysen zur Unternehmensbesteuerung 
(Empirical analysis on corporate taxation)
∗ 
1 Motivation 
Die vergangenen zwei Dekaden waren in den meisten Volkswirtschaften durch 
eine Globalisierung der Märkte gekennzeichnet. Dabei ist zwischen den Staaten ein 
Wettbewerb um den mobilen Faktor Kapital entstanden, der Wachstum, Investitionen, 
Beschäftigung und damit den Wohlstand garantieren soll. Eines der Instrumentarien um 
den konkurrierenden Faktor ist die Besteuerung der Unternehmen. Damit gilt diesem 
Aspekt sowohl in der Politik als auch in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung eine 
gestiegene Aufmerksamkeit. Hinsichtlich der Forschung, die den Zusammenhang 
zwischen der Unternehmensbesteuerung und dem unternehmerischen Kapitalstock 
untersucht, ist mittlerweile eine beträchtliche Zahl von Literatur entstanden. Aus der 
vorhandenen Literatur sind jedoch zwei Schwächen zu erkennen. Erstens basieren nach 
wie vor viele der empirischen Analysen auf makroökonomischen Zeitreihendaten. Diese 
weisen den Nachteil auf, dass keine ausreichende Berücksichtigung der Heterogenität 
des Unternehmenssektors erfolgt. Eine zweite Schwäche der bestehenden Arbeiten liegt 
in der Verwendung von Reduzierte-Form-Modellen. Die Entwicklung und der Einsatz 
von strukturellen Modellen, die das gezielte Testen von Hypothesen vereinfachen und 
tendenziell eine sinnvollere Interpretation zulassen, spielt noch eine untergeordnete 
Rolle. 
Die Relevanz empirischer Arbeiten verdeutlicht sich an einigen Fakten 
hinsichtlich der Entwicklung der Steuersätze in ausgewählten Industrieländern. In den 
letzten Jahren ist in nahezu allen Industrieländern eine große Zahl von 
Steuerreformmaßnahmen zu beobachten. Die Abbildung 1 gibt einen ersten Überblick 
über die Reduzierung der Körperschaftsteuersätze in einigen Industrieländern.  
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Abbildung 1. Körperschafsteuersätze in 1982 und 2004 
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Mit Ausnahme von Irland ist in allen dargestellten Ländern eine deutliche 
Reduzierung der tariflichen Steuersätze zu verzeichnen. Neben Schweden und Finnland 
ist vor allem in Deutschland eine deutliche Reuzierung der tariflichen Steuerbelastung 
zu verzeichnen.  
Da die tariflichen Steuersätze nur bedingt geeignet sind, um Aussagen über die 
effektive Steuerbelastung zu treffen, werden in der Literatur die Methode der effektiven 
marginalen Steuerbelastung (EMTR) und der effektiven durchschnittlichen 
Steuerbelastung (EATR) verwendet. Die Abbildungen 2 und 3 zeigen die 
durchschnittliche Belastung nach diesen Verfahren. Beide Verfahren belegen, dass sich 
die marginale Steuerbelastung in den dargestellten Ländern angenähert hat. Da die 
Zahlen nicht auf Mikrodaten beruhen und die Methoden nicht die gesamten steuerlichen 
Rahmenbedingungen erfassen, tragen sie nur einen begrenzten Maße zum Verständnis 
der Wirkungsweise der Besteuerung auf das unternehmerische Verhalten bei.   8
Abbildung 2. Effektive marginale Steuersätze in 1982 und 2004 
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Quelle: Clark (2006). Für Großbritannien und Irland liegen für 1982 keine Zahlen vor. 
Abbildung 3. Effektive durchschnittliche Steuersätze in 1982 und 2004 
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Die vorliegenden vier Arbeiten leisten einen Beitrag zur empirischen Forschung 
unter Verwendung von Mikrodaten und sollen vor allem das Verständnis von 
ausgewählten Teilbereichen der Unternehmensbesteuerung verbessern. Dabei 
konzentrieren sich die Arbeiten auf die Aktivitäten deutscher Unternehmen im In- und 
Ausland sowie ausländischer Unternehmen in Deutschland. Die Basis der Analysen 
bilden vor allem Daten der Deutschen Bundesbank, die über sehr große Datensätze mit 
teils einzigartigem Charakter verfügt. Die Arbeiten lassen sich in die drei 
Themenbereiche  Finanzierungsstruktur,  einheitliche Bemessungsgrundlage sowie 
Messung marginaler Steuerbelastung eingliedern.  
Hintergrund des ersten Themenbereiches zur Finanzierungsstruktur ist die 
empirische Beobachtung einer zunehmenden konzerninternen Finanzierung von 
ausländischen Tochterunternehmen in Deutschland. Theoretische Überlegungen gehen 
davon aus, dass Unterschiede in der Besteuerung der Schuldzinsen eine 
grenzüberschreitende Fremdfinanzierung attraktiv erscheinen lassen und somit zu einer 
Verlagerung der im Inland erzielten Profite führen. Die vorgelegte Arbeit gliedert sich 
in eine Reihe von empirischen Untersuchungen ein, die für die USA (Altshuler and 
Grubert 2003 sowie Desai, Foley and Hines 2003) und Kanada (Jog und Tang 2001) 
vorliegen. Während in den erwähnten Arbeiten ein signifikanter Zusammenhang 
zwischen dem ausländischen Steuersatz und der Verschuldung nachgewiesen werden 
konnte, gibt die empirische Analyse für Deutschland nur einen begrenzten Hinweis auf 
eine derartige Beziehung. Dies kann einerseits auf Messprobleme zurückzuführen sein 
und andererseits in der Ermangelung eines geeigneten theoretischen Modells bedingt 
sein.  
Der zweite Themenbereich, aus dem zwei Forschungsarbeiten hervorgegangen 
sind, beschäftigt sich mit dem Phänomen, dass multinationale Unternehmen zunehmend 
internationale Steuerarbitragemöglichkeiten ausschöpfen, um ihre effektive 
Steuerbelastung zu reduzieren. Die damit verbundenen Steuerausfälle, die 
Ungleichbehandlung zu rein national agierenden Unternehmen sowie die negative 
politische und öffentliche Bewertung dieser Praktiken führten zu der Diskussion um die 
Einführung einer einheitlichen steuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlage in der Europäischen 
Union (EU Kommission 2001). Derzeit gibt es einige Arbeiten, die diese Thematik 
diskutieren (Devereux 2004, Gordon and Wilson 1986, Mintz 2004, Mintz and Weiner   10
2003, Sorensen 2004, Shackelford and Slemrod 1998), allerdings mit nur geringer 
empirischen Evidenz für Deutschland. 
Ausgangspunkt der zweiten Forschungsarbeit ist ein aktueller Fall, den der 
Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH) verhandelt. Dabei geht es um die Frage, ob Verluste 
ausländischer Tochtergesellschaften bei der Mutterfirma im Inland von der 
Bemessungsgrundlage der Unternehmenssteuer abgezogen werden dürfen. Da eine 
entsprechende Verlustverrechnung im konkreten Fall innerhalb Großbritanniens, nicht 
aber grenzüberschreitend möglich ist, könnte dies ein Verstoß gegen die EU-Verträge 
sein. In der empirischen Analyse werden zu erwartende Steuereinnahmeeffekte für den 
deutschen Fiskus berechnet, die mit der Einführung einer EU-weiten 
Verlustverrechnung verbunden wären. Für den Zeitraum von 1998 bis 2002 wäre den 
Berechnungen zur Folge mit Steuerausfällen in einer Größenordnung von etwa 30 
Milliarden Euro zu rechnen. 
Die dritte Forschungsarbeit setzt an der Thematik der grenzüberschreitenden 
Verlustverrechnung an und analysiert die zu erwartenden Effekte, die sich mit der 
Einführung einer EU-weiten Benessungsgrundlage unter Berücksichtigung einer 
Zuteilungsformel ergeben. Hier sind die Resultate richtungsweisend für künftige 
finanzpolitische Entscheidungen der Europäischen Union. Eine Zuteilungsformel, die 
sich an der ökonomischen Aktivität der Unternehmen orientiert, würde zu einem 
deutlichen, EU-weiten Rückgang der nationalen Bemessungsgrundlagen führen. 
Tendenziell sind jedoch kleine Länder und Länder, die steuerliche Anreize für 
Buchprofite geben, stärker betroffen.  
Im Unterschied zu den ersten drei Forschungsarbeiten ist das vierte 
Forschungsprojekt tendenziell eher methodischer Natur. In der empirischen Literatur 
kristallisierten sich in den vergangenen Jahren zwei Methoden heraus, die zur Messung 
der marginalen Steuerbelastung von Unternehmen herangezogen werden. Wie eingangs 
skizziert dominieren die Methode des effektiven marginalen Steuersatzes (EMTR) und 
des effektiven Durchschnittssteuersatzes (EATR) die empirische Literatur. Eine 
Übersicht über diese Methoden und empirischen Ergebnisse geben Devereux, Griffith 
und Klemm (2002). Diese Ansätze sind jedoch nicht unumstritten. Der Nachteil besteht 
darin, dass Unternehmen mit Verlusten unzureichend in der Methodik berücksichtigt   11 
bleiben. An diesem Punkt setzt die von Graham (1996a und 1996b) entwickelte 
Methode der simulierten marginalen Steuersätze an, die endogen die Ertragssituation 
berücksichtigt. In der durchgeführten Analyse wird erstmals für Deutschland die 
Eignung dieser Methodik anhand ausgewählter Investitionsfunktionen überprüft. Die 
vorliegenden Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Methode sinnvoll in Investitionsfunktionen 
eingesetzt werden kann und somit die empirische Literatur ergänzt. 
Die vorliegenden Forschungsarbeiten dienen als Ergänzung zur bestehenden 
empirischen Literatur. Durch die Verwendung von vertraulichen Mikrodaten geben die 
Arbeiten einen Beitrag zum Verständnis aus den Teilbereichen der 
Finanzierunkstruktur, der gemeinsamen Bemessungsgrundlage sowie der Messung der 
marginalen Steuerbelastung. Darüber hinaus können die Analysen eine 
Diskussionsgrundlage für die Ausgestaltung künftiger Steuerpolitik in Deutschland und 
der EU sein. Angesichts der bislang geringen empirischen Evidenz für Deutschland 
wurden die Arbeiten bereits mit Interesse aufgenommen. Drei der vier vorliegenden 
Arbeiten sind in Fachzeitschriften publiziert (bzw. eine der Arbeiten erscheint 2007). Im 
Folgenden werden die wesentlichen Resultate der Arbeiten zusammengefasst.  
2  Kurzzusammenfassung der Arbeiten 
2.1  Taxes and the financial structure of German inward FDI (Fred Ramb 
and Alfons J. Weichenrieder) 
Das erste Papier entstand gemeinsam mit Alfons Weichenrieder (Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt) und ist in der Fachzeitschrift Review of World Economics (Vol. 
141, No. 4, 2005, S. 670-692) erschienen. Das Papier analysiert auf Basis eines 
Reduzierte-Form-Modells die Finanzierungsstruktur von ausländischen 
Direktinvestitionen in Deutschland außerhalb des Finanzsektors. Im Jahr 2001 wurden 
bei diesen durchschnittlich 25 % der Bilanzsumme durch firmeninternes Fremdkapital 
finanziert. Für Unternehmen, die einem ausländischen Investor direkt, also ohne 
deutsche Zwischengesellschaft angehören, entfallen dabei auf grenzüberschreitende 
Intrafirmenkredite 20 % der Bilanzsumme. Oft werden Steuern als Erklärung für diesen 
hohen Umfang angeführt. Unterliegen die Zinsen im Ausland einem niedrigen 
Steuersatz und sind sie als Schuldzinsen gegen einen hohen deutschern Steuersatz 
absetzbar, resultiert insgesamt eine Steuerersparnis. Weil diese mit dem   12
Auslandssteuersatz abnimmt, sollte man erwarten, dass die grenzüberschreitende 
Fremdfinanzierung insbesondere dann anzutreffen ist, wenn die Mutter der deutschen 
Tochter einen niedrigen Steuersatz hat. Anhand eines Panel-Datensatzes mit ca. 8.000 
Auslandstöchtern in Deutschland ergibt sich nur begrenzte Evidenz dafür, dass der 
Heimatsteuersatz des ausländischen Investors für den Umfang der konzerninternen 
Fremdfinanzierung bedeutsam ist. Zum Teil könnte dies mit der fehlenden Information 
über die Gewinn- bzw. Verlustsituation des ausländischen Investors zusammenhängen.. 
Die begrenzte Evidenz zum Einfluss des Auslandssteuersatzes sollte jedenfalls nicht 
dahingehend interpretiert werden, dass bei der konzerninternen Fremdfinanzierung 
Steuerwägungen keine Rolle spielen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Unternehmen, die im 
Durchschnitt über die Jahre profitabel sind, mit ihren Krediten stärker auf Änderungen 
des deutschen Körperschaftsteuersatzes reagieren als andere Unternehmen. Dies legt 
nahe, dass der deutsche Steuersatz eine wichtige Rolle für die Höhe der internen 
Fremdfinanzierung spielt. Im Hinblick auf Fremdkapital von Dritten zeigt sich ein 
signifikanter Effekt der deutschen Steuer bei Töchtern, die über eine deutsche 
Zwischengesellschaft gehalten werden, nicht jedoch bei unmittelbaren 
Auslandstöchtern.  
Die Fremdfinanzierungsentscheidungen sind sicherlich nicht ausschließlich von 
steuerlichen Erwägungen getrieben. Ein anderer wichtiger Einfluss ist die (geringe) 
Profitabilität. Der Großteil der grenzüberschreitenden Firmenkredite wird von 
Unternehmen gehalten, die Verluste verzeichnen. Die Paneldatenanalyse liefert 
Hinweise dafür, dass eine Gewinnverringerung um ein Prozent der Bilanzsumme mit 
einer Erhöhung der Intrafirmenkredite um 0,3 Prozent der Bilanzsumme einhergeht. 
2.2  The Tax Revenue Implications of Marks & Spencer for Germany 
(Clemens Fuest, Thomas Hemmelgarn and Fred Ramb) 
Das zweite Papier ist im Rahmen eines Gemeinschaftsprojekts mit Clemens Fuest 
und Thomas Hemmelgarn von der Universität Köln bei Tax Notes International (May 
30, 2005, S. 763-767) erschienen.  
Ein aktueller Fall, den der EuGH verhandelt, könnte die Zukunft der 
Unternehmensbesteuerung und die nationalen Steuereinnahmen maßgeblich 
beeinflussen. Im so genannten Fall Marks & Spencer (C-443/03) geht es um die Frage,   13 
ob Verluste ausländischer Tochtergesellschaften bei der Mutterfirma im Inland von der 
Bemessungsgrundlage der Unternehmenssteuer abgezogen werden dürfen. Dies ist in 
Großbritaannien für inländische Mutterunternehmen mit inländischen Töchtern möglich 
(group relief), jedoch nicht für ausländische Tochterfirmen. Dadurch werden 
ausländische Tochterfirmen benachteiligt. Da eine Diskriminierung 
grenzüberschreitender Investitionen gegenüber inländischen Vorgängen gegen EG-
Recht verstößt, wird erwartet, dass der EuGH der Klage von Marks & Spencer stattgibt 
und die grenzüberschreitende Verlustverrechnung ermöglicht.  
Ein solches Urteil hätte weit reichende Folgen für die nationalen Steuer- und 
Finanzpolitiken. Auch in Deutschland könnten Unternehmen das Recht einklagen, in 
der Vergangenheit aufgetretene Auslandsverluste Steuer mindernd mit inländischen 
Gewinnen zu verrechnen. Für die Zukunft müssten auch die deutschen Regelungen zur 
grenzüberschreitenden Verlustverrechnung dem EG-Recht angepasst werden. Die 
Einführung einer grenzüberschreitenden Verlustverrechnung in der EU wirft vielfältige 
ökonomische und finanzpolitische Fragen auf. Im Mittelpunkt der finanzpolitischen 
Debatte steht derzeit allerdings die Frage, welche fiskalischen Konsequenzen die 
EuGH-Rechtsprechung haben könnte. Es wird befürchtet, dass vor allem eine 
rückwirkende Verlustverrechnung zu Steuererstattungen führen könnte, welche die 
ohnehin angespannten öffentlichen Haushalte vor weitere Probleme stellen würde. 
Darüber hinaus stellt sich die Frage, wie sich eine grenzüberschreitende 
Verlustverrechnung auf die Steuereinnahmen auswirken würde. Dies wird von der 
genauen Ausgestaltung der Verlustverrechnung abhängen. Derzeit wird die Einführung 
einer Verlustverrechnung mit einer Nachversteuerung im Fall später auftretender 
Auslandsgewinne diskutiert. Eine solche Nachversteuerungsregelung könnte die zu 
erwartenden Aufkommensverluste begrenzen. Ob und in welchem Umfang dies erreicht 
wird, hängt von der Struktur der Verlust- und Gewinnverläufe der 
Auslandsinvestitionen ab.  
Vielfach wird vermutet, dass eine grenzüberschreitende Verlustverrechnung zu 
Steuerausfällen in Milliardenhöhe führen könnte. Bislang liegen allerdings keine 
Berechnungen vor, welche die zu erwartenden Aufkommensverluste quantifizieren. Das 
Papier untersucht unter Verwendung der Mikrodatenbank Direktinvestitionsbestände 
der Deutschen Bundesbank, welche Aufkommenswirkung die Einführung einer EU-  14
weiten Verlustverrechnung für den deutschen Fiskus hätte. Die Analyse verwendet die 
in der Vergangenheit beobachteten Gewinne und Verluste deutscher Direktinvestitionen 
im EU-Ausland.  
Welche Aufkommenswirkung eine Verlustverrechnung auf europäischer Ebene 
für den deutschen Fiskus hat, hängt von der Ausgestaltung der Verrechnungsregel ab. 
Ohne eine Nachversteuerung ausländischer Gewinne ist mit erheblichen Steuerausfällen 
zu rechnen. Rückblickend wären Werte von insgesamt rund 30 Milliarden Euro für die 
Jahre 1998 bis 2002 möglich. Dabei wurde angenommen, dass die Verlustverrechnung 
die Gewerbesteuer nicht betrifft. Wird eine Nachversteuerungsregel eingeführt, so zeigt 
die Analyse, dass die Steuerausfälle zwar geringer sind, jedoch bei weitem nicht 
ausgeglichen werden können. Dazu ist das Steueraufkommen aus der Nachversteuerung 
mit durchschnittlich 500 Millionen. Euro pro Jahr zu klein. 
In den Berechnungen sind keine Verhaltensänderungen der Unternehmen 
berücksichtigt. Geht man davon aus, dass Unternehmen systematisch versuchen, 
Gewinne in Niedrigsteuerländern und Verluste in Hochsteuerländern anfallen zu lassen, 
so dürften die in Deutschland deklarierten Verluste höher sein als hier angenommen. 
2.3  How would formula apportionment in the EU affect the distribution 
and the size of the corporate tax base? An analysis based on German 
multinationals (Clemens Fuest, Thomas Hemmelgarn and Fred Ramb) 
Aus der Kooperation mit Clemens Fuest und Thomas Hemmelgarn von der 
Universität Köln ist ein weiteres Papier entstanden, dass den Refereeprozess bei 
International Tax and Public Finance erfolgreich durchlaufen hat und voraussichtlich 
im Frühjahr 2007 publiziert wird.. 
Die EU-Kommission hat in ihrem Bericht zur Unternehmensbesteuerung im 
europäischen Binnenmarkt aus dem Jahre 2001 den Vorschlag gemacht, eine 
einheitliche europäische Bemessungsgrundlage für europaweit tätige Unternehmen zu 
schaffen. Eine solche einheitliche Bemessungsgrundlage soll nach Vorstellung der EU-
Kommission (wie eingangs beschrieben) anhand einer bestimmten Zuteilungsformel auf 
die Länder verteilt werden. Die Faktoren in der Formel sollen die Aktivität der 
jeweiligen Unternehmen in den Ländern berücksichtigen. Mögliche Zuteilungsfaktoren, 
die die ökonomische Aktivität eines Unternehmens in einem Land messen, wären etwa   15 
die Umsätze, die Sachanlagen oder die Lohnsumme eines Unternehmens. Eine solche 
einheitliche EU-Bemessungsgrundlage soll die Anreize zu Gewinnverschiebungen der 
Unternehmen reduzieren und vor allem die Kosten der Unternehmen senken, die durch 
den Umgang mit 25 verschiedenen Steuersystemen in der EU entstehen. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit unternimmt einen ersten Versuch, den Effekt der 
Einführung einer solchen einheitlichen EU-Bemessungsgrundlage und der damit 
verbundenen Zuteilungsregeln auf die Höhe der Bemessungsgrundlage und ihre 
Verteilung auf die EU-Mitgliedsländern zu messen. Dieser Versuch wird durch die 
Datenlage erschwert, denn zurzeit liegen keine Daten eines repräsentativen Ausschnitts 
europäischer multinationaler Unternehmen vor. Daher werden in diesem Aufsatz nur 
Daten deutscher multinationaler Unternehmen mit ausländischen Töchtern in der EU 
verwendet. Ein solches Vorgehen ist vertretbar, wenn man davon ausgeht, dass 
multinationale Unternehmen aus anderen Mitgliedsländern eine ähnliche Gewinn- und 
Verlust-Verteilung aufweisen und es somit möglich ist, von den Ergebnissen für 
deutsche multinationale Unternehmen auf EU-weite Effekte zu schließen. 
Zur Berechnung der Effekte wird ein kombinierter Mikro-Datensatz auf 
Firmenebene verwendet, der sich aus der Mikrodatenbank Direktinvestitionen (MiDi) 
der Deutschen Bundesbank und Unternehmensbilanzstatistiken (Ustan und 
Hoppenstedt) zusammensetzt. Mit diesen Daten für die Jahre 1996 bis 2001 werden die 
Bemessungsgrundlage im Status Quo und die Bemessungsgrundlage für den Fall einer 
einheitlichen EU-Bemessungsgrundlage mit Zuteilungsfaktoren kalkuliert, die ebenfalls 
aus dem Datensatz berechnet wurden. 
Ein Vergleich der Zahlen für beide Szenarien zeigt, dass in der Tendenz kleine 
Länder und insbesondere die kleineren Länder, die gemeinhin als attraktive Gastländer 
für Buchprofite gelten, in einem System mit Zuteilungsformel stärker verlieren als 
große Länder. Der Grund hierfür ist, dass in dem in unserer Stichprobe betrachteten 
Zeitraum große Länder im System getrennter Buchführung eine zu geringe 
Bemessungsgrundlage erhalten, wenn man die ökonomische Aktivität im Land für eine 
Zuteilung einer einheitlichen Bemessungsgrundlage zugrunde legt. Diese Beobachtung 
bestätigt sich, wenn wir die Zuteilungsformel ohne Berücksichtigung einer 
internationalen Verlustverrechnung anwenden. In diesem Fall gewinnen die großen   16
Länder oder stellen sich zumindest nicht schlechter, während die kleineren Länder zum 
Teil deutlich verlieren. 
Neben der neuen Verteilung des Steueraufkommens zeigt sich auch ein deutlicher 
Effekt auf die Summe der Steuerbemessungsgrundlagen aller Länder. Die Einführung 
einer einheitlichen Basis würde im verwendeten Datensatz zu einem Rückgang der 
gesamten Bemessungsgrundlage führen. Der Grund hierfür ist die Möglichkeit eines 
internationalen Verlustausgleichs, der die Bemessungsgrundlage entsprechend reduziert. 
Diese Ergebnisse müssen jedoch angesichts der sehr schwierigen Datengrundlage 
vorsichtig bewertet werden. Es stehen nur Daten für deutsche multinationale 
Unternehmen und deren Tochterfirmen zur Verfügung und dies auch nur für einen 
begrenzten Zeitraum, der möglicherweise nicht repräsentativ ist. Wir betrachten somit 
nur einen Ausschnitt einer EU-Bemessungsgrundlage und zwar den Teil, der von 
deutschen multinationalen Unternehmen im betrachteten Zeitraum gebildet wird. Eine 
Verbesserung der Datenlage zur Berechnung europäischer Steuerfragen wäre daher von 
hohem Nutzen, um robustere Aussagen über die Entwicklung des Steueraufkommens 
machen zu können. Die Daten werden zur Zeit nur für die Länder berechnet, die vor 
dem 1. Mai 2004 Mitglieder der EU waren. Zusätzlich können mit diesen 
rückblickenden Daten keine Verhaltensänderungen der Unternehmen abgebildet 
werden, die bei einem solchem Systemwechsel zu erwarten sind.  
2.4  Corporate Marginal Tax Rate, Tax Loss Carryforwards and 
Investment Functions – Empirical Analysis using a Large German Panel Data Set 
(Fred Ramb) 
Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Besteuerung und dem unternehmerischen 
Investitionsverhalten ist Gegenstand einer großen Zahl empirischer Analysen. Die in der 
Literatur verwendeten Methoden der EMTR und EATR weisen jedoch eine wesentliche 
Schwäche auf. Ein wesentliche Annahme ist, dass Unternehmen einen Gewinn 
aufweisen. Die Möglichkeit eines Verlustes und dem damit verbundenen effektiven 
marginalen Steuersatzes von Null bleibt typischerweise unberücksichtigt. Eine 
Ausnahme hierzu stellt die von Graham entwickelte Methode der simulierten 
marginalen Steuersätze dar, die eine explizite Modellierung der Ertragssituation 
vorsieht. Im Rahmen dieses Ansatzes wird die steuerliche Verlustverrechnung explizit   17 
berücksichtigt und kann damit als ein geeignetes Instrumentarium zur Analyse von 
Steuerreformmaßnahmen dienen. 
Die vierte Arbeit entwickelt die erste empirische Analyse, die den Zusammenhang 
zwischen dem Investitionsverhalten von in Deutschland ansässigen Unternehmen und 
den von Graham entwickelten empirisch bestimmten marginalen Steuersätzen 
untersucht. Die durchgeführte empirische Analyse basiert auf dem umfangreichsten 
Jahresabschlussdatensatz für Deutschland, der zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken genutzt 
werden kann. Unter Verwendung der Unternehmensbilanzstatistik der Deutschen 
Bundesbank wurden über 100.000 Unternehmen im Beobachtungszeitraum von 1971 
bis 2002 untersucht. Die deskriptive Analyse zeigt, dass etwa zwei Drittel der 
Unternehmen im Beobachtungszeitraum mindestens in einem Jahr Verluste und/oder 
einen Verlustvortrag ausweisen. Dabei unterscheiden sich die Länge und die Höhe der 
Verluste von der Größe eines Unternehmens, wobei große Unternehmen tendenziell 
höhere und zeitlich längere Verluste ausweisen. Seit den 90er Jahren lässt sich zudem 
ein deutlicher Anstieg der Verluste und Verlustvorträge beobachten. Die unter 
Berücksichtigung der Verluste und Verlustvorträge berechneten erwarteten marginalen 
Steuersätze nach Graham zeigen nur vergleichsweise geringe Unterschiede zwischen 
den Größenklassen der Unternehmen. Der durchschnittliche marginale Steuersatz liegt 
jedoch deutlich unter dem tariflichen Steuersatz. 
Die multivariate Analyse liefert Anhaltspunkte für plausible Ergebnisse der 
marginalen Steuersätze in dem Reduzierte-Form-Modell (ADL-Modell). Die geschätzte 
Elastizität liegt betragsmäßig zwischen 0.1 und 0.2. Eine Reduzierung des marginalen 
Steuersatzes um 10% würde demnach mit einer durchschnittlichen Erhöhung der 
Investitionsneigung von 1 bis 2 Prozent verbunden sein. Die Verwendung der 
marginalen Steuersätze in einem Fehlerkorrekturmodell führt hingegen zu keinen 
plausiblen Ergebnissen. Zusammenfassend kann jedoch festgehalten werden, dass die 
Methode als eine zusätzliche Informationsquelle im Rahmen von empirischen Analysen 
anzusehen ist, die neben den bekannten Methoden der EMTR und EATR durchaus eine 
Berechtigung besitzt.    18
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I 
Taxes and the financial structure of German inward FDI 
1 Introduction 
There is widespread concern that multinational firms may evade a large portion of 
their statutory tax burden by shifting income out of high-tax jurisdictions. While such a 
concern is certainly not restricted to Germany, the high statutory rates of corporate tax 
in Germany – at least until the recent tax reform in 2001 – make it most likely that the 
country is particularly prone to this problem. Throughout the 1990s Germany had the 
highest tax rate on retained corporate profits (including average local taxes) among 
OECD countries. 
Income shifting may take the form of prices that depart from arms-length 
conditions and may imply excessive management and overhead fees, the setting of non-
market interest rates within a group etc. Besides setting tax-efficient transfer prices on 
intra-firm trade, multinationals may also use the financial structure to minimise taxes 
and thereby allocate interest deductions to highly taxed affiliates for which this tax 
shield is most valuable. In this paper we want to explore to what extent the financial 
structure of German inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is due to tax-saving 
behaviour.
1 During the 1990s the net German FDI inflow was financed to a large extent 
by intra-company debt incurred outside Germany. According to Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1993), 61.9% of the German inflow of FDI in 1990 and 1991 was financed by intra-
company loans, and this strong role of intra-company loans in German inward FDI has 
led to the suspicion that these loans are indeed encouraged by high German tax rates 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1997, page 67f, Weichenrieder 1995, page 183). To the best of 
our knowledge this paper is the first attempt to look at this question using German firm-
level data on inward FDI and unlike previous studies we use not only variations in the 
tax rate of the subsidiary but also variations in the tax rate of the parent firm to test for 
financial effects at the level of the subsidiary.  
                                                 
1 For papers that provide evidence on tax motivated transfer pricing policies of multinationals see, for 
example, Grubert and Mutti (1991), Collins and Shackelford (1998), or Rousslang (1997).    20
Our study is based on the Bundesbank FDI statistics that cover all foreign direct 
investments, which meet mild size requirements. Unlike most studies on FDI with non-
U.S. data, we can draw on micro data from 1989 – 2002 to study this question and a 
panel structure is available for the years 1996 – 2002.
2 
While there is a large number of studies on the tax effects on FDI, most are 
concerned with the effect of local taxes on the overall FDI inflow of a region.
3 There are 
only a few studies on the financial structure. Notable exceptions are studies by Altshuler 
and Grubert (2003), Jog and Tang (2001), and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003a). 
Altshuler and Grubert consider a cross-section sample of US subsidiaries abroad and 
analyse the liability and asset side of these firms. The study shows an inverse 
relationship between the foreign tax rate and the amount of financial assets held abroad. 
On the liability side, a 1 percentage point increase in the foreign tax rate is associated 
with an increase of roughly .4 percentage point in the debt to total asset ratio. The paper 
by Jog und Tang looks at US and Canadian firms. The authors show that the reduction 
in the Canadian corporate tax rate in the late 1980s triggered a reduction in the debt 
ratio of Canadian affiliates. Finally, Desai, Foley, and Hines find for a panel of US-
owned foreign firms that a 1 percentage point increase in the foreign corporate tax rate 
leads to an increase in the external debt to asset ratio of roughly .25 percentage point 
and an increase in internal borrowing of some .08 percentage point.  
In section 2 we will briefly discuss the tax arbitrage possibilities of multinational 
firms that consider alternative ways of financing their German investment. In Section 3 
the Deutsche Bundesbank FDI database is used to present descriptive statistics of 
financial structures of German inward FDI.
4 By identifying the home countries of 
foreign affiliates operating in Germany and employing the respective tax rate of the 
parent, we are able to proxy the global tax saving of a profitable firm that decides to 
distribute a euro of equity to its parent and to replace this euro by an intra-company loan 
granted by the parent. Section 4 develops the empirical model and presents the 
econometric results before section 5 concludes.  
                                                 
2 For reasons of data protection the data before 1996 have been anonymised, and the panel structure has 
therefore been lost. 
3 For a detailed survey and meta study see Ederveen and de Mooij (2001). 
4 For a description of this database see Lipponer (2003).   21 
Our empirical analysis is based on a huge panel of more than 8,000 firms. We find 
that the corporate tax rate of the parent, which has been omitted in previous studies, has 
no significant impact on the financial structure of a German subsidiary. Conversely, a 
significant effect of the German tax rate is visible for firms that are directly owned by 
foreign investors. To identify this influence, we exploit the fact that unprofitable firms 
should be less affected by a change in the German corporate tax than profitable firms. 
Indeed, our results show that among German subsidiaries, which are directly held by a 
foreign investor, profitable firms react significantly different from non-profitable firms. 
When the German tax rate increases, profitable firms that are directly owned by a 
foreign investor significantly increase the amount of intra-company debt compared to 
unprofitable foreign-owned firms. This effect is absent though for subsidiaries that are 
held via intermediate German affiliates, the majority of which does not use cross-border 
intra-company loans.  
Besides tax incentives, our study identifies (low) profitability as a major factor 
that explains the diversity of intra-company loans. Roughly 60% of the cross-border 
intra-company debt turns out to be held by firms that are running losses and profitability 
turns out to be highly significant in our panel regressions of intra-company loans.  
2  The tax preferences for intra-company loans 
From a tax perspective, the incentives for a foreign parent to grant an interest bearing 
loan to a profitable German subsidiary will depend on the German tax rate at which the 
interest is deductible, on the one hand, and the tax rate at which the interest is taxable in 
the home country of the parent, on the other hand. 
To be more specific, consider the option of a German affiliate to use its profit to 
pay back an intra-company loan granted by the parent. Let 
∗ τr , 
∗ τd ,
∗ τi  be the effective 
corporate tax rates on German retained earnings and on earnings that are distributed 
from the German subsidiary to the foreign parent and the rate at which the German 
affiliate can deduct interest paid to the parent. The latter rate may fall short of the rate 
on retained earnings since in Germany only half of the interest on medium and long-
term debt is deductible from the local trade tax (Gewerbesteuer). The rate 
∗ τd  is an 
effective rate that is influenced by the German corporate tax on distributed profits, by   22
the German withholding tax on dividends and by additional taxes in the home country 
of the parent if this country does not exempt foreign dividends.  
If the German affiliate pays back a loan of €1 today, the parent is able to distribute this 
€1 as a dividend to its own shareholders. This however, comes at a cost. To pay back a 
loan of €1, the German affiliate needs a pre-tax income of  ()
∗ τ − r 1 1  euro. Since this 
sum is not available for profit distribution, the parent forgoes () ()
∗ ∗ τ − τ − r d 1 1  euro in 
dividends. Hence, the total change in dividends that the parent can pay today (before 
personal taxes of the shareholder of the parent) is given as 
( )
()
∗
∗
τ −
τ −
− ≡
r
d a
1
1
1  (1) 
There is, however, an additional effect on future dividends. Since the debt service 
of the affiliate drops by the tax deductible interest rate on the retired loan, dividends 
may rise by  ()
∗ τ − i i 1  in all future periods, where i is the nominal interest rate. Since 
these dividends are taxed at the rate for distributed profits rather than at the rate on 
retained earnings, the parent receives a stream of dividends of 
() ( ) ()
∗ ∗ ∗ τ − τ − ⋅ τ − r d i i 1 1 1 , the cash value of which is 
( ) ( )
() () m i
i
b
r
d i
− ⋅ τ −
τ − ⋅ τ −
≡ ∗
∗ ∗
1 1
1 1 , (2) 
where  () m i − 1  is the discount rate applied by a shareholder of the parent.  
A third effect that has to be taken into account is that the parent in all future 
periods lacks the interest income on the retired euro. Denoting the parent firm's tax rate 
at which the interest is taxable by τ, the cash value of this effect amounts to  
()
() m i
i
c
−
−
≡
1
1 τ  (3) 
Obviously, assuming constant tax rates and abstracting from taxes on capital 
gains, the profitability of the intra-company loan depends on the sign of () c b a − + . If 
this sign is negative, intra-company loans dominate equity in the form of retained   23 
earnings as a source of finance for the German affiliate. One problem in international 
studies such as ours is that one can only speculate about the applicable tax rate m of the 
final investor. We follow a standard assumption in the literature on the international 
cost of capital (OECD 1991) and assume that the final investor is tax exempt (m = 0). 
Consequently,  
() () () τ − τ − τ τ − = − + − =
∗ ∗ ∗
r i d c b a DIFF 1 1  (4) 
is an indicator of the tax dominance of intra-company loans over retained earnings of 
the German affiliate. It should be noted that DIFF is also the relevant indicator for the 
tax advantage of reducing the third-party debt of the German affiliate by €1 and 
increasing the third-party debt of the foreign parent by €1. In this case the capital market 
can be thought of as financing a back-to-back transaction with the affiliate and the 
parent. Moreover, things are very similar if the corporation is considering a new equity 
injection by the parent or, alternatively, an intra-company loan to finance the subsidiary. 
Again, it can be shown that the relationship between the German and the foreign tax 
rates is crucial.
5  
The above arbitrage argument assumed that the parent and the German affiliate are 
profitable and do pay taxes. For German firms that are unprofitable, however, the right 
to deduct interest from the high taxed German tax base tends to be less valuable. At 
best, such a firm may be able to use a loss carry-backward or a loss carry-forward to 
decrease taxable income in other fiscal years. In the case of a loss carry-forward this 
comes at a cost as the loss carry forward is not interest bearing. The effective rate at 
which interest is deductible reduces. Conversely, if the parent firm, which receives the 
interest income, is running losses, then the effective tax rate may be lower than the 
statutory tax rate τ. Unfortunately, we do not know about the tax status of the parent so 
we cannot exploit such a difference in effective rates.  
From the above argument we have that the profit or loss position of the German 
affiliate changes the influence of the Germany tax rate since it may reduce the value of 
the interest deduction, but, given the profit or loss position of the parent, it does not 
                                                 
5 For an extensive discussion of the tax-induced financial preferences of multinational firms see Alworth 
(1988), Keen (1991) or Weichenrieder (1995).   24
change the effective tax rate at which interest income of the parent is taxed. This 
suggests to split up the variable DIFF into a German part and a foreign part when the 
profit or loss position of the German subsidiaries is considered in the empirical 
implementation. Firms that do pay taxes are expected to react more strongly to a 
German tax rate change than firms that are in a loss position.  
3 Descriptive  statistics 
Despite its recently sluggish growth rates, Germany is still one of the main recipients of 
inward FDI. For end-2000 the OECD FDI statistics record an inward stock of FDI of 
€482 billion for Germany compared €277 billion for France, €121 billion for Italy and 
€479 billion for the UK. The present section gives information on the overall financing 
patterns of the German FDI stock and additional stylised facts. We will concentrate on 
non-financial firms (excluding banks, pure holding companies, and insurance 
companies) that are separately incorporated in Germany (dropping branches), and we 
will exclude investment in the government and not-for-profit sectors.  
In its yearly survey of the stock of German inbound FDI, the Bundesbank collects 
data on the liability side of the balance sheets such as paid-up capital, capital reserves, 
profits and losses carried forward, and debt, including loans received from affiliated 
firms inside and outside Germany. The prime purpose of the data collection is to give a 
picture of the cross-border ownership of firms and the stocks of FDI in Germany. A 
somewhat unusual feature of the balance sheets collected by the Bundesbank is that they 
contain the yearly profit after taxes but before dividend distributions as a separate part 
of the equity of the firm. Therefore the balance sheets provide information on current 
profits despite the fact that there is no explicit profit and loss statement. On the asset 
side, data are available on fixed assets and intangibles, financial assets and working 
capital.  
For each firm in the sample we can identify the foreign country of the investor, 
which may not be the ultimate investor but a foreign holding or intermediate company, 
and the share that this investor has in the German affiliate. An important distinction in 
the German data is the one between directly and indirectly held inward FDI. An indirect 
participation applies if the German affiliate is held by a German company that, in turn,   25 
is owned by a foreign investor. A direct participation is defined as one where the 
German affiliate is directly owned by a foreign investor.  
Figure 1. Main investors by country  
a) Directly held affiliates  b) Indirectly held affiliates 
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Annotation: Investor countries by relative contribution to balance sheet total of directly and indirectly 
held foreign affiliates in Germany. United States (US), Netherlands (NL), Japan (JP), Switzerland (CH), 
France (FR), United Kingdom (UK), Italy (IT), Austria (OE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank database. Subsample of non-financial firms.  
 
As has been found for US data, most of the FDI is wholly-owned. In 2002, for 
example, almost 70% of the directly held subsidiaries had only one foreign investor. 
Figure 1 shows how the total assets of the affiliates can be attributed to investors from 
different countries. Allthough the investors of German inbound FDI are rather unevenly 
spread out across investing countries, there remains a rather large number of 
investments coming from smaller countries. Figure 1 shows a dominance of US 
investors, which has seemingly declined during the 1990s. This may be partly due, 
however, to the increased use of (often Dutch) intermediate holdings (cf. also Desai, 
Foley and Hines 2003b, Mintz 2003).    26
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, aggregated sample (2001) 
 Direct  Indirect 
Balance sheet item  Total 
(  billion)
Fraction 
of balance 
sheet 
Total 
(  billion) 
Fraction 
of balance 
sheet 
Paid-up capital  19.200  10.6945  20.600  8.7026 
Capital  reserves  39.400 21.9686 28.400 11.9889 
Surplus  reserves  2.151 1.1991 6.498 2.7394 
Profit/loss carry-
forward 
-10.900 -6.0962  -2.459  -1.0367 
Current profits  -1.515  -0.8447  1.424  0.6003 
Debt 94.300  52.5342  126.000  53.1273 
 Liabilities  to 
affiliated companies 
47.200 26.3162 75.900 32.0105 
 in  Germany  11.300  6.3081  58.800  24.8007 
 outside  Germany  35.000  19.5071  15.400  6.4763 
Other  liabilities  36.900 20.5447 56.600 23.8784 
Balance sheet total  179.000  1  237.000  1 
 
Let us now turn to the financial structure. Table 1 gives the crude picture. In 2001 
the balance sheet total of directly held firms amounted to €179 billion.
6 About 11% of 
this was financed by paid-up capital and some 23% consisted of retained earnings from 
previous periods (capital and surplus reserves). On aggregate, loss carry-forwards 
amounted to roughly 6%. Debt and other liabilities made up for roughly 73% of the 
aggregated balance sheets. The financing pattern changes when we turn to indirectly 
held firms, i.e. corporations that are not directly held by a foreign company but held via 
an intermediate company located within Germany. The two types of firms differ with 
respect to the capital reserves, the loss carry-forwards and the liabilities to affiliated 
companies. While overall debt makes up for roughly 53% of the balance sheets in both 
cases, indirectly held firms tend to owe more to affiliated companies. Moreover, the 
structure of these liabilities differs between the two types of firms. Indirectly held firms 
tend to owe most of this (25% of the balance sheet) to affiliate companies within 
Germany and directly held firms owe most of it (20%) to affiliated firms outside 
Germany. This reflects the fact that indirectly held firms are owned by German 
                                                 
6 Due to an increase in the thresholds for the reporting requirement, the year 2001 is somewhat more 
representative for our data than the year 2002.    27 
intermediate companies that can act as financial clearing institutions for their 
subsidiaries. Conversely, directly held subsidiaries are held by a foreign firm or foreign 
holding company and are less likely to face an affiliated company in Germany. By 
international standards, the amount of cross-country intra-company debt looks large. 
For comparison, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003a) report that US-owned foreign 
affiliates, on a worldwide average, finance 8% of their total assets by borrowing from 
their US parent. Similarly, Altshuler and Grubert (2003) report for a sample of 5,981 
US-owned non-financial subsidiaries that loans from stockholders amounted to roughly 
10% of total assets in 1996. German non-financial FDI abroad is also financed by intra-
company loans to a much lesser extent. In 2001 the liabilities of those firms to German 
affiliates (including their German parent) amounted to some 8.7% of the balance sheet 
total and the liabilities to non-German affiliates were 8.3%.  
The summary statistics of Table 1 do not, of course, reflect the possibly large 
heterogeneity in the data across firms and across investor countries. Therefore, Figure 2 
gives some information on firm heterogeneity. Each of the 12 graphs (6 for direct and 6 
for indirect participations) contains 5 lines. The bold line represents the respective 
financing ratio of the median firm, i.e. 50% of the firms have a lower financing ratio. 
The other curves represent the financing ratios for the 5%, 25%, 75% and 95% centile 
firms.  
Several features are remarkable. As shown in the first graph of Figure 2, after the 
year 1996 more than 5% of the firms had paid-up capital that amounted to more than 
100% of total assets. Technically, this is possible if there are negative items on the 
liability side of the balance sheet such as loss carry-forwards or current losses.    28
Figure 2. Diversity in financial ratios  
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Annotation: In each graph, the bold line indicates the respective financial ratio of the median firm. The 
two lines below the median line characterise the financial ratio of the 5th and 25th centile firms, the two 
lines above the median ratio indicate the 75th and 95th centiles. Each of the left hand diagrams refers to 
the subsample of firms that are directly held by a foreign firm, while the graphs on the right hand refer to 
firms in Germany that are foreign held via a German company.  
 
Indeed, from 1993 onwards, directly held affiliates experienced growing loss 
carry-forwards. The value of a firm that represents the fifth centile in terms of this 
balance sheet item has doubled from 1995 to 2002 and amounted to 180% of the 
balance sheet total at the end of the period, implying negative equity. For 5% of the   30
indirectly held firms loss carry-forwards still exceeded 44% of the balance sheet. From 
1993, extreme outliers are present also when we consider current net-of-tax profits of 
directly and indirectly held firms. In 1995, 5% of the directly held affiliates had a 
current loss that exceeded 21% of their balance sheet and, by the year 2002, 5% of the 
firms had a yearly loss that amounted to at least 44% of their balance sheet total. In the 
case of indirectly held affiliates, losses for the fifth centile reached 10% of the balance 
sheet total in 1995 and 13% in 2001. It should be noted that a growing number of firms 
are running huge losses in consecutive years. While the huge number of unprofitable 
operations is surprising, it is also remarkable that a large number of firms report exactly 
zero net-of-tax profits and this holds true for the median directly and indirectly held 
firms in almost any year from 1989 to 2001.  
Turning to total debt, in recent years 5% of the directly held affiliates have had a 
share of debt in balance sheet total that exceeded unity. As with paid-up capital, this is 
possible in the case of negative current profits and/or negative profit carry-forwards. 
Finally, for at least 5% of the directly held subsidiaries liabilities to affiliated firms 
outside Germany account for more than 100% of the balance sheet total after 1995. For 
the fifth centile, the fraction is growing and was 1.24 in 2002. Interestingly, the 
development of the internal debt in this centile closely corresponds to the development 
of losses for the fifth centile. Quite obviously, for some firms current losses are covered 
by intra-company loans instead of new equity.  
To sum up the above description, in the second half of the 1990s the financial 
structure of a sizeable fraction of the inward FDI projects in Germany was strongly 
influenced by large losses and this holds particularly for directly held firms. In many 
cases losses were accumulating over time and to some extent intra-company loans were 
used to finance these losses. While corporate losses seem to play a huge role in 
explaining the financial structures of some firms, the next sections will analyse what 
role is left for tax differences between Germany and the home country of the investor. 
Before we will do so, however, we will briefly introduce our tax rate data.  
Figure 3 gives an impression of the distribution of DIFF, as defined in section 2, 
for the full sample of all directly and indirectly held affiliates in our data set with all   31 
years pooled.
7 The data set contains tax information from up to 69 countries and digests 
information on the foreign corporate taxes including average local taxes, the German 
withholding tax on dividends and the German corporate tax (including average local 
taxes) against which firms can deduct interest expenses.
8 The tax rates were collected by 
using various publications of PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young, and the 
database of the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan.
9 To 
calculate the tax rate on distributed earnings 
*
d τ  we had to identify the relevant 
withholding tax rates on dividends and the tax system in the parent's home country 
(exemption or credit system). In the case of an exemption system, 
*
d τ  equals the German 
rate on distributed profits plus the applicable withholding rate on dividends. If the home 
country of the parent uses a credit system of taxation and its tax rate exceeds the 
effective German rate on distributions, then we set 
*
d τ  to equal the home country tax 
rate. In cases, in which a German firm is owned by several investors from foreign 
countries, we use average values of DIFF, with the fractions of the ownership stakes 
taken as weights. Rather than showing the histogram itself, Figure 3 gives a Kernel 
density estimate, which makes it somewhat easier to compare the distribution with a 
normal distribution. For a very large share of the observations DIFF is positive implying 
that for tax reasons it pays for a profitable multinational to substitute intra-company 
debt for equity (i.e. to distribute retained earnings). But owing to the German split rate 
system of the corporate tax with its smaller rate on distributed profits and the limited tax 
deductibility of interest against the local taxes for some countries during the 1990s, 
DIFF was (partly) negative. Italy and Japan are examples. When we look at the time 
variation in the tax rate data, 62 per cent of the home countries in our sample did 
experience corporate tax rate changes during the period 1996-2002 and the average 
standard deviation of the national corporate tax rate is some two percentage points.  
                                                 
7 In those cases where the affiliate is owned by foreign investors from more than one country we calculate 
DIFF as a weighted average of the individual country values (weights taken from the ownership of 
shares). 
8 In selected cases, we decided to depart from headline corporate taxes in investor countries due to special 
regimes. For example, a huge fraction of German subsidiaries is held via Dutch holdings. Since 1997, 
these holding can allocate 80 per cent of their interest income to special provisions, which in effect 
exempts 80 per cent of the income. Therefore we adjusted the Dutch tax rate accordingly.  
9 We are grateful to Jack Mintz for joint efforts in accomplishing this.    32
Figure 3. The distribution of DIFF0 
 
4 Empirical  Evidence 
The role of taxes on the financial structure has been widely analysed in empirical 
studies, but most studies are concerned with national firms and national tax systems.
10 
While the older literature has generally failed to find significant effects on corporate 
financing, recent studies of national firms have been more successful in identifying tax 
effects. MacKie–Mason (1990) looks at the marginal source of finance as a function of 
the corporate tax rate by looking at the loss carry-forward position of firms. For firms 
with high loss carry-forwards the tax deductibility of interest has a lower value than for 
profitable firms. MacKie–Mason shows for a sample of US corporations that firms with 
high loss carry-forwards indeed use less debt at the margin. Givoly et al (1992) use a 
similar method and use the natural experiment of the US 1986 tax reform act. Gentry 
(1994) compares US firms that operate in special industries and can avoid the double 
taxation under the US corporate tax system with other firms that are subject to double 
taxation of corporate profits. Indeed the first group of corporations shows a significantly 
different financing behaviour. Graham (1999) argues that empirically the tax rate of the 
personal investor plays a role in corporate financing decisions. Gordon and Lee (1999) 
exploit the fact that in the US smaller corporations are granted a lower corporate tax rate 
and find a significant effect of this lower rate. Finally, Gropp (2002) shows a sizeable 
                                                 
10 There is a huge theoretical literature on the determinants of the financial structure of corporations. A 
useful survey of this literature is given in Harris and Raviv (1991).    33 
tax effect on the financing of marginal corporate investment by exploiting local tax 
differentials for German firms. 
So far, there is rather limited evidence on the empirical effects of international 
taxation on the financing of multinationals. Three notable exceptions have been 
described in the introduction, and all of them identify effects for US-owned 
subsidiaries.  
In this study we want to address the question of how tax rate differences between 
the home country of an investor and Germany influence the financial structure of 
German inward FDI. Therefore, the endogenous variable that is of foremost interest to 
us is the amount of intra-company loans granted to a German affiliate by its foreign 
investor divided by the balance sheet total (LIABOUTGER). As we cannot exactly 
distinguish from which country a loan is granted we employ the working hypothesis that 
all debt from non-German affiliated companies comes from the parent and the 
applicable tax rates for this country are taken into account.  
Table 2 summarises our findings for the liabilities to non-German affiliated 
companies (cross-border intra-company loans). Since the Breusch-Pagan and the 
Hausman tests reject the use of random-effects models, we report only the results for 
fixed-effects models. Because of the quite different importance of cross-border intra-
company loans for directly and indirectly held affiliates we analyse them in separate 
subsamples. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for a model in which the variable 
DIFF summarizes the tax incentives to borrow from the parent. From section 2, we 
should expect that DIFF is positively correlated with the amount in intra-company 
loans. The model behind columns (3) and (4) splits up the effects of the foreign tax rate 
and the German tax rate. A larger foreign tax rate should lead to heavier taxation of 
interest paid by the affiliate and should make cross-border loans less attractive. We 
therefore expect a negative coefficient. Conversely, the higher the German rate, the 
higher is the value of interest deductions and the more cross-border loans should be 
expected. The problem here is that the German statutory tax rate is the same for all 
firms in our sample. In a model with fixed time effects the respective coefficient 
therefore cannot be identified. To overcome this problem we split our sample into a 
subsample of firms that on average show a positive profitability and into a second   34
subsample of firms that have zero or negative average profitability across observations. 
A dummy PROFIT takes on the value one for a firm in the first subsample and the value 
zero, otherwise.
11 The variable GERTAX is the product of this dummy and the German 
corporate tax rate as it is relevant for interest deductions. As has been argued in section 
2, profitable (i.e. taxable) firms can be expected to react more strongly with their 
leverage decision upon a German tax rate change. Therefore we expect a positive 
coefficient of the variable GERTAX, which also has a sizeable variation over the years 
since the German tax rate relevant for interest deductions has come down from 59.65% 
in 1996 to 33.07% in 2002.  
Table 2. Determinants of cross-border intra-company loans 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Directly  held 
affiliates  
Indirectly 
held 
affiliates  
Directly held 
affiliates  
Indirectly 
held 
affiliates  
DIFF -0.024  0.021     
 (0.016)  (0.008)***     
CT     0.003  -0.007 
    (0.014)  (0.011) 
GERTAX     0.137  -0.014 
    (0.054)**  (0.007)** 
PROFITABILITY  -0.302 -0.073 -0.293 -0.062 
  (0.033)*** (0.025)*** (0.033)***  (0.027)** 
SIZE  0.053 0.001 0.054 0.001 
  (0.006)*** (0.001) (0.006)*** (0.001) 
COLLATERAL  -0.066 -0.066 -0.064 -0.065 
  (0.018)*** (0.012)*** (0.018)*** (0.012)*** 
Observations  25,540 15,090 25,821 15,318 
Number of 
firms 
4,985 3,314 4,985 3,314 
R-squared  0.79 0.48 0.78 0.48 
Notes: Dependent variable: liabilities to affiliated companies outside Germany over the balance sheet 
total. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Unbalanced sample for the years from 1996 to 2002. Firm fixed-effects (within) estimator. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering across country observations and for heteroscedasticity. A full set of 
time dummies has been used; coefficient estimates are not reported. We eliminated outliers by excluding 
observations for which the exogenous variables PROFITABILITY, COLLATERAL and SIZE were 
either in their two lowest or in their two highest percentiles. We also excluded firms that on average 
across all observations had a debt to asset ratio of unity or larger. To be included observations had to be 
consecutive for at least three years. Total assets are used on both sides of the equation in the denominators 
of LIABOUTGER, COLLATERAL and PROFITABILITY. Since this poses potential endogeneity 
problems, we also used instrumental variables approaches (using a GMM model) but the test statistics 
always rejected the validity of the available instruments. Therefore the GMM results are not reported. 
 
                                                 
11 For 68 per cent (42 per cent) of the directly (indirectly) held firms in the sample of Table 2, PROFIT 
takes on the value one.    35 
Columns (1) and (2) use the variable DIFF, columns (3) and (4) use CT and 
GERTAX. The tax variable DIFF is found to be non-significant for directly held firms 
in column (1). This result changes if we look at indirectly held firms in column (2). 
Here the coefficient is significant, but is still economically small. It suggests a .2 
percentage point increase in the ratio of cross-border loans to total assets if the home 
country rate increases by 10 percentage points.  
A possible reason for this weak correlation is that a large percentage of the firms 
in our sample have negative profits in consecutive years. The models in columns (3) and 
(4) report the results for variables CT and GERTAX and try to overcome this problem. 
We find that the influence of the parent's home tax rate, CT, is still insignificant for 
directly and indirectly held affiliates. Turning to the coefficient GERTAX we find a 
significant and sizeable effect for directly held firms that receive the major part of cross-
border intra-company loans. The coefficient implies that an increase of the German tax 
rate of 10 percentage points increases the fraction of cross-border loans to balance sheet 
total by some 1.37 percentages points relative to the control group that on average 
shows non-positive profitability. While this effect of the host country tax rate is 
somewhat smaller that identified in studies on US affiliates abroad, it is in the same 
order of magnitude. Surprisingly, we get a negative sign of GERTAX when analyzing 
the indirectly held affiliates in column (4). While it is statistically significant, the 
coefficient for these firms is very small in economic terms and it must be kept in mind 
that the large majority of these firms do not utilise cross-border intra-company loans (cf. 
Figure 2).  
Drawing on the empirical model of Rajan and Zingales (1995), we add several 
other variables that may play a role for the financial structure. A large ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets can be interpreted as a sign for good collateral. This may reduce the 
agency cost of borrowing and may increase firm value in the event of illiquidity of the 
firm. This in turn should increase the availability of third-party debt and may reduce the 
need for loans by the parent. This leads us to introduce the ratio of fixed assets and 
intangibles to total assets as the explanatory variable COLLATERAL.
12 
COLLATERAL has a significantly negative coefficient for all but one subsample 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, the Bundesbank data pool fixed assets and intangibles and fixed assets cannot be 
identified separately.    36
(profitable indirectly owned affiliates). This is in line with a substitution theory between 
intra-company debt and third-party debt and the hypothesis that collateral increases the 
access to third-party debt.  
Access to third-party debt may also vary with firm size. If larger corporations are 
more diversified than smaller ones, the former may have a smaller default risk and 
better access to outside debt (reducing the need for intra-company debt). But, of course, 
larger corporations may simply be better equipped with equity and may need less third-
party debt as well as less intra-company loans. In any case, size may matter, and we 
therefore introduce the right-hand variable SIZE, defined as the log of total assets 
(balance sheet total). The coefficient for size turns out to be insignificant for the sample 
of indirectly held firms but significantly positive for the directly held affiliates, which 
may reflect that large, mature firms have a better equity base.  
While the significance of the variable GERTAX is evidence that tax 
considerations do matter for the size of cross-border intra-company loans, this may not 
be the full story. Indeed, only some 55% of the German affiliates are financed by cross-
border intra-company loans. As we have seen from the descriptive statistics, a sizeable 
fraction of the foreign subsidiaries in Germany run huge losses and intra-company loans 
seemed to be an important instrument to keep those firms alive. In total, 60% of all 
cross-border intra-company loans are granted to affiliates that are in a loss position and 
therefore have a limited benefit from interest deductibility. This alone suggests a strong 
role of cross-border loans in covering losses. Another piece of evidence for the role of 
losses is the coefficient of the variable PROFITABILITY in Table 2, which is defined 
as the ratio of current profits net of taxes to total assets. We find a significant negative 
and sizeable correlation between PROFITABILITY and cross-border intra-company 
loans for directly held firms. The marginal effects reported in Table 2 indicate that a 
reduction in profits of 1% of the balance sheet total leads to additional cross-border 
loans of .3% of the balance sheet total. While PROFITABILITY is also significant in 
explaining the intra-company loans for indirectly held firms, the estimated coefficients 
are much smaller. This reflects the fact that for indirectly held firms a German 
intermediate company is available to provide short-term finance and cross-border loans 
are largely redundant.   37 
It should be noted that the coefficient for the variable PROFITABILITY may 
suffer from an endogeneity problem since our estimation makes use of the profit after 
interest payment: additional intra-company loans lead to additional interest payments 
that reduce accounting profits and the right-hand side variable PROFITABILITY. Note 
that the possible bias should be small, though. If we consider total assets of a firm as 
given and normalized to unity and introduce the unobserved (after tax) interest rate r, 
our estimation equation may be re-written as  it it t i it it it X h g r D E D ε β + + + + ⋅ − = β ) ( 0 , 
where D is the amount of intra-company loans, E denotes the amount of earnings before 
interest on these loans, gi is a firm-fixed effect, ht is a time fixed effects and Xit is a 
vector of the other regressors. Using the estimated value of β0,  0 β
)
, and differentiating 
with respect to E and D,  the effect of a change of E on D is derived as 
) 1 /(
d
d
0 0 r
E
D
⋅ + = β β
) )
. If we assume a (constant) net of tax interest rate of r = 10%, then 
the 'true' coefficient for  E D d / d  was -0.311 rather than the estimated  0 β
)
 of -0.302 
presented in column (1) of Table 2. Given a lack of economically reasonable and 
statistically valid instruments for the profit before interest we decided to accept the 
possibility of such a limited bias. 
As mentioned in section 2, a close substitute to an intra-company loan is to 
increase third party debt of the high-tax affiliate in Germany and to reduce third party 
debt of the parent firm.
13 For parent firms in low-tax jurisdictions (high DIFF) debt is 
less advantageous from a tax saving perspective and parents may use less leverage. This 
in turn allows them to increase the leverage in high tax affiliates (like German ones) 
without unduly increasing the multinational's overall leverage. Unfortunately, we are 
not in a position to use the balance sheets of parent firms to find additional evidence for 
such countervailing effects abroad. But as pointed out in section 3, the tax preferences 
for such a transaction should again be influenced by our variable DIFF and the tax 
attractiveness of third-party for financing German subsidiaries should be influenced by 
this variable. We therefore re-ran the regressions presented in table 2, but using third-
party debt to balance sheet total as the endogenous variable (Table 3).  
                                                 
13 For a discussion of similar financing strategies see Altshuler and Grubert (2003).   38
For the directly held affiliates (column (1)) DIFF has the expected sign and is 
significant, although the estimated coefficient is small. For indirectly held firms 
(column (2)) the coefficient turns out to be insignificant. If we instead use the variables 
CT and GERTAX, these results turn around: now the variable GERTAX has the 
expected and significant sign for indirectly held affiliates but is insignificant for directly 
held firms. The home country tax rate CT is insignificant in both cases. Together this 
provides only limited evidence that tax rates play a major role in the decision to raise 
outside debt.  
Table 3. Determinants of third-party debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Directly  held 
affiliates  
Indirectly 
held 
affiliates  
Directly held 
affiliates  
Indirectly 
held 
affiliates  
DIFF  0.034 0.013     
  (0.014)** (0.020)     
CT    -0.020  0.035 
   (0.014)  (0.025) 
GERTAX    0.068  0.036 
   (0.043)  (0.018)** 
PROFITABILITY  -0.222 -0.120 -0.222 -0.146 
  (0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.033)*** 
SIZE  0.034 0.018 0.034 0.018 
  (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)*** (0.003)*** 
COLLATERAL  0.110 -0.029 0.103 -0.033 
  (0.026)*** (0.021) (0.027)*** (0.020) 
Observations  25,339 14,923 25,616 15,143 
Number of 
firms 
4,927 3,284 4,927 3,284 
R-squared 0.80  0.57 0.80 0.57 
Notes: Dependent variable: liabilities to affiliated companies outside Germany over the balance sheet 
total. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Unbalanced sample for the years from 1996 to 2002. Firm fixed-effects (within) estimator. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering across country observations and for heteroscedasticity. A full set of 
time dummies has been used; coefficient estimates are not reported. We eliminated outliers by excluding 
observations for which the exogenous variables PROFITABILITY, COLLATERAL and SIZE were 
either in their two lowest or in their two highest percentiles. We also excluded observations for which the 
endogenous variable was in the two highest percentiles. To be included observations had to be 
consecutive for at least three years.  
 
PROFITABILITY again turns out to have a highly significant influence. The 
variable SIZE is positively correlated with third-party debt, which suggests that larger 
firms have better access to third party debt. COLLATERAL is significant and positively 
correlated with third-party debt in the case of directly held firms but is insignificant for 
indirectly held affiliates.    39 
5 Discussion 
The paper has analysed the financial structure of German inbound FDI in the non-
financial sector. On average, some 25% of the balance sheet total of these firms was 
financed by intra-company loans in 2001 and for affiliates that are directly held by a 
foreign investor, cross-border intra-company loans account for 20% percent of balance 
sheet total. Tax rate differentials are frequently named as a possible explanation for this 
strong role of intra-company loans in financing foreign subsidiaries in Germany. If the 
interest on the loan is received in a low-tax country but is tax deductible in high-tax 
Germany, this financial instrument can produce a global tax saving for the 
multinational, the amount of which decreases in the foreign country's tax rate. Therefore 
we should expect that cross-border intra-company loans are used more extensively 
when the parent is located in a low-tax country. Based on a panel of 8,000 firms 
operating in Germany, we could provide only limited evidence that the home tax rate of 
the foreign parent is important for the amount of intra-company loans. Possibly, our 
analysis here suffers from lacking information on whether the foreign parent is in a loss 
position. In any case, the failure to identify sizeable effects of the home country tax rate 
does not imply that foreign affiliates that operate in Germany do not use financial 
strategies to save taxes. Our empirical results have shown that directly held subsidiaries 
that on average are profitable do react more strongly to the German tax rate than other 
subsidiaries. This suggests that the size of the German tax rate does play a role for the 
leverage decision. Considering third-party debt in the hand of Germany-based affiliates 
our results show a significant effect of the German tax rate when we look at indirectly 
held affiliates but not when we look at directly held affiliates.  
Leverage decisions of foreign subsidiaries are certainly not exclusively steered by 
tax considerations, although these considerations do seem to play a role. Another 
important factor of cross-border intra-company loans is (low) profitability. The majority 
of cross-border intra-company loans are received by loss-making subsidiaries. In our 
panel analysis we find that for directly held foreign affiliates a reduction in profits by 
1% of the balance sheet is associated with an increase of cross-border loans by .3% of 
balance sheet total. Profitability, besides the different use of cross-border intra-company 
loans, is another area where directly and indirectly held firms differ starkly. Foreign-
owned firms that are held via a German intermediate company show a much lower   40
variation in profitability than do directly held affiliates and a majority of the indirectly 
held firms shows virtually zero profitability. Further analysis of these differences may 
potentially lead to additional insights into the tax avoidance strategies of multinational 
firms but are left for future research.  
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II 
The Tax Revenue Implications of Marks & Spencer  
for Germany 
1 Introduction 
The European Court of Justice ruling in the Marks & Spencer case (C-443/03) 
may force EU member countries to allow multinational firms to set foreign losses 
against domestic taxable profits. That may give rise to considerable tax revenue losses. 
This paper uses the foreign direct investment database (FDI database) of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank to calculate potential revenue losses for Germany. For the tax revenue loss, 
the Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI database shows that a retroactive loss offset for the 
years 1997-2002 would cause a revenue loss of up to €30 billion, or 1.5 percent of 
German gross domestic product. That result is based on the assumption that all foreign 
losses can be set against domestic profits, which requires profits of all parent companies 
to be sufficiently high. It should therefore be interpreted as an upper boundary for the 
revenue losses. We also consider the introduction of bordercrossing group relief with 
subsequent taxation rules. In principle, subsequent taxation may limit the revenue losses 
caused by border-crossing loss offsets. But our calculations suggest that the revenue that 
can be raised through subsequent taxation will reduce the revenue losses from border-
crossing loss offset by no more than 5 percent to 10 percent. Those numbers should be 
interpreted taking into account that we have abstracted from behavioral adjustments. If 
those adjustments are considered, it is likely that the revenue losses in countries with 
high statutory tax rates will be even higher.  
In principle, the EC Treaty grants full sovereignty to member states in direct tax 
matters. But recently, national tax systems have increasingly been challenged by rulings 
of the ECJ. Conflicts between nations’ tax systems and EC law may arise if national tax 
rules discriminate against bordercrossing economic activity relative to purely national 
activity. 
The case of U.K.-based retailer Marks & Spencer is a widely discussed example 
of that type of conflict. In the 1990s, subsidiaries of Marks & Spencer in Germany, 
Belgium, and France started to suffer considerable losses and ceased trading in 2001.   43 
Marks & Spencer then claimed group relief in the United Kingdom; that is, the firm 
attempted to set the losses incurred abroad against profits earned in the United 
Kingdom. U.K. tax authorities rejected that claim on the grounds that U.K. group relief 
is restricted to domestic subsidiaries. Marks & Spencer challenged that decision before 
U.K. courts and the High Court of Justice asked the ECJ to clarify whether the U.K. 
group relief rules are compatible with EC law. It is likely that the ECJ will decide that 
the restriction of group relief to domestic subsidiaries violates the freedom of 
establishment in the European internal market.
14 
Because most EU member countries have similar group relief rules, the ECJ 
decision in Marks & Spencer will affect governments throughout Europe. Most 
importantly, a decision against the restriction of group relief to domestic subsidiaries 
would imply that multinational companies in all member states might pursue similar 
claims against their governments, leading to major tax revenue losses. Moreover, 
governments may face a significant decline in corporate tax revenue if existing group 
relief schemes must be extended to EU-wide operations. 
Although the budgetary implications of the Marks & Spencer case are a major 
concern among national policymakers in the European Union, the magnitude of those 
potential revenue losses is largely unclear. This paper attempts to calculate the revenue 
losses for Germany using profits and losses of foreign subsidiaries of German 
multinational firms reported in the FDI database of the Deutsche Bundesbank
15, as 
discussed above. We restrict our analysis to subsidiaries in the EU 15, that is, those 
countries that were EU member states before May 1, 2004.
16  
Our analysis focuses on two questions. First, we assess the potential tax claims 
from foreign losses suffered by German multinational firms in the past. Second, we ask 
whether tax revenue losses from border-crossing group relief can be limited if 
deductions due to foreign losses are ‘‘clawed back’’ when the subsidiary sets those 
losses against profits in a later year. Such a subsequent taxation rule would be 
                                                 
14 See Advocate General Miguel Poiares’s opinion on the Marks & Spencer case, summarized in ECJ 
release 29/05 from April 7, 2005. Our analysis does not investigate the revenue implications of this more 
restrictive type of loss offset rule. The final decision of the ECJ will clarify whether such a limitation of 
border-crossing loss offset would be compatible with EC law. 
15 A detailed description of this dataset give Lipponer (2003). 
16 For the juridical aspects see Schön (2004).   44
compatible with EC law and would prevent bordercrossing loss offsets from creating 
‘‘double or multiple dip’’ opportunities, when loss offsets are effectively used more 
than once. 
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In the first section, we describe how the 
volume and the profitability of German foreign direct investment in the European Union 
have developed since 1989. In the second section, we calculate the tax revenue losses 
that would arise if German firms were allowed to set their foreign losses incurred in the 
past against domestic profits. Section III investigates the effect of introducing 
subsequent taxation rules on tax revenue. Section IV provides a conclusion. 
2  German Foreign Direct Investment In the European Union 
The budgetary implications of border-crossing loss offset will only be significant 
if the amount of foreign direct investment of German firms in other EU countries is 
sufficiently large. Table 1 reports how the stock of foreign direct investment of German 
firms in the European Union has developed since 1989. German outbound FDI can be 
found in all EU member states. The stock of foreign direct investment increased 
considerably between 1989 and 2001 and declined slightly in 2002. 
Table 1. German FDI Positions in the EU (in billions of euros) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Benelux  12.7 15.8 19.2 23.7 25.7 27.5 30.0 
France 8.1  9.2  10.5 11.6 11.9 12.7 14.0 
UK  6.2 7.7 8.2 8.1 9.1  12.1  17.0 
Italy  4.6 5.4 6.4 5.9 6.1 6.4 7.4 
Ireland  0.9 2.9 5.3 6.3 6.9 6.6 7.4 
Austria  2.7 3.1 3.6 4.3 4.8 5.4 5.5 
Poland  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 
EU10 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 2.3 3.2 4.5 
EU15  42.1 52.4 62.9 69.3 73.4 80.9 92.4 
EU25  42.1 52.5 63.2 70.0 75.7 84.1 96.9 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Benelux  31.7 36.8 36.5 47.5 68.1 74.9 78.1 
France  15.9 16.5 20.6 20.9 29.6 38.2 38.2 
UK  20.4 25.4 26.4 35.5 49.2 55.3 54.1 
Italy  9.1  10.4 12.0 13.6 16.5 16.5 18.4 
Ireland  7.5 7.7 7.3 8.3 6.1 6.6 6.8 
Austria  5.9 6.7 8.5 9.1  15.2  15.2  15.5 
Poland  1.4 2.4 3.7 4.9 6.9 8.5 7.9 
EU10  7.3  9.4  12.4 15.8 21.8 25.5 28.1 
EU15  103.1 117.8 128.4 157.9 209.9 234.1 241.9 
EU25  110.4 127.2 140.8 173.8 231.7 259.5 270.0   45 
 
That decline may reflect the economic downturn that occurred in that year, which 
is also likely to have reduced foreign direct investment. Moreover, the year 2002 is the 
first year that the selection criteria for the foreign direct investment statistic was 
changed and smaller projects were excluded from the FDI database, which may also 
partly explain the decline in the numbers. In 2002, the stock of foreign direct investment 
in the European Union was €241 billion.
17 Table 1 also reports the numbers for some 
major EU member states and the aggregate values for the new member countries (EU 
10) and the entire European Union (EU 25).
18 
How large were the profits and losses incurred by foreign subsidiaries of German 
multinational firms in the period under consideration? Table 2 reports the aggregate 
profits and losses for the period between 1989 and 2002.
19 
Table 2. Profits and Losses of German FDI in the EU (in millions of euros) 
 Profits  Loses 
1989 5439,5  -888,2 
1990 7023,4  -1657,0 
1991 7858,0  -2522,9 
1992 7264,5  -3694,1 
1993 8196,3  -4290,6 
1994 10265,4  -2704,9 
1995 11704,1  -4596,0 
1996 12,565.3  -4,989.3 
1997 15,325.6  -5,850.8 
1998 19,165.3  -8,567.5 
1999 23,089.8  -14,044.7 
2000 43,259.4  -16,743.3 
2001 30,251.4  -21,340.5 
2002 33,207.3  -30,466.6 
 
It turns out that both profits and losses have increased considerably over time. But 
it is striking to note that losses have increased much faster than profits. Figure 1 
demonstrates that by normalizing the values of the year 1989 to 100, the increase of 
losses is much higher than the growth of profits in the same period. 
                                                 
17 The attribute ‘‘German’’ refers to firms residing in Germany. That includes firms in foreign ownership. 
18 EU 15 refers to countries that were members of the European Union before May 1, 2004. EU 10 refers 
to the countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and EU 25 refers to the current European Union. 
19 The numbers in Table 2 include 100 percent of the losses, even if the share held by the German parent 
firm is smaller. Most subsidiaries in the data set are fully owned by the German parent company. In the 
calculations in Table 4, the ownership share is taken into account.   46
Figure 1. Profits and Losses of German FDI in the EU (with 1989=100) 
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We may thus state that German foreign direct investment has generated 
considerable losses during the last decade. Surprisingly, the increase in losses has been 
much larger than the growth in profits even though foreign direct investment is usually 
perceived to be a highly profitable activity. Our findings also seem to be inconsistent 
with the widespread view that German firms use transfer pricing to shift profits to other 
countries because the statutory tax rate on corporate profits in Germany is higher than in 
most other countries.
20 
3  Implications for Tax Revenue 
The effects of foreign loss offsets on domestic tax revenue depend, among other 
things, on the profit situation of the parent company. If the parent company suffers 
losses from domestic activities as well, foreign loss offsets have no immediate 
budgetary impact. But if the parent company earns profits in later years, foreign losses 
will eventually be used as a tax shield and thus reduce domestic tax payments. In our 
data set, only part of the subsidiaries can be matched to domestic parent companies. As 
a working hypothesis, we therefore assume that foreign losses can always be set against 
                                                 
20 See Bond (2000)   47 
domestic taxable profits in the same period. We thus calculate an upper boundary for 
the potential revenue losses.  
Apart from the profit or loss position of the parent company, the revenue effect of 
border-crossing loss offsets depends on whether losses set against domestic profits will 
be subject to subsequent taxation if the foreign subsidiary sets those losses against 
foreign profits in a later year. As a first step, we abstract from the possibility of 
subsequent taxation. 
The yearly tax revenue losses from bordercrossing loss offsets may now be 
calculated simply by multiplying the overall foreign losses with the German statutory 
corporate income tax rate (Körperschaftsteuer), including surcharges. We do not take 
into account the German local trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) because it is not clear whether 
that tax will also be subject to the ECJ ruling. The results are given in Table 3. For 
instance, in the year 2000, border-crossing loss offsets would have reduced corporate 
tax revenue by approximately €7 billion, which is equivalent to roughly one-third of 
overall corporate tax revenue in that year. If claims based on foreign losses incurred in 
the past go back to losses incurred in 1998 or later, the potential revenue losses add up 
to approximately €30 billion, or 1.5 percent of GDP. 
Table 3. Losses in Corporate Tax Revenue Assuming Complete Loss Offset (in 
millions of euros) 
Year  Tax Rate  Losses  Loss in Tax 
Revenue 
1989  56.00%   888.2   497.37 
1990  50.00%   1,657.0   828.52 
1991  53.75%   2,522.9   1,356.09 
1992  53.75%   3,694.1   1,985.57 
1993  53.75%   4,290.6   2,306.22 
1994  48.38%   2,704.9   1,308.48 
1995  48.38%   4,596.0   2,223.31 
1996  48.38%   4,989.3   2,413.59 
1997   48.38%   5,850.8   2,830.30 
1998  47.48%   8,567.5   4,067.41 
1999  42.20%   14,044.7   5,926.88 
2000   42.20%   16,743.3   7,065.68 
2001  26.38%   21,340.5   5,628.57 
2002  26.38%   30,466.6   8,035.57 
   48
Those numbers show that a retroactive bordercrossing loss offset imposed by the 
ECJ ruling in the Marks & Spencer case is likely to have dramatic consequences for the 
government budget in Germany. However, the numbers reported in Table 3 have been 
calculated assuming that all losses can be offset against domestic profits, so those 
numbers must be interpreted as a maximum for the possible revenue losses. 
4  Tax Revenue Losses Under Subsequent Taxation Rules 
One possibility of adjusting group relief to EC law requirements would be to 
allow border-crossing loss offsets, but to introduce subsequent taxation for foreign 
losses if those losses are set against foreign profits at a later date. That would not only 
avoid the possibility of double-dip or multiple-dip strategies (that is, the possibility that 
losses are deducted more than once), it would also limit the decline in tax revenue to be 
expected from border-crossing loss offsets in the future. The revenue effects of 
subsequent taxation will depend on the prevailing pattern of profits and losses in foreign 
direct investment projects. If the typical investment project first suffers losses and later 
generates profits, the tax revenue losses for the home country of the parent company 
due to foreign loss offsets will be small. If, in contrast, the typical pattern is one in 
which projects are either profitable very quickly or generate losses and cease trade, 
subsequent taxation rules would not prevent tax revenue losses. As in the preceding 
section, we assume that the profits of the parent company are always sufficiently high, 
so that foreign losses can be set against domestic profits. The difference from the 
preceding section is that those losses are subject to subsequent taxation if the foreign 
subsidiary later makes profits. For those calculations we need panel data because we 
must identify the profit and loss positions of individual foreign subsidiaries across time. 
Our data set allows us to do so only from 1997 on. 
In Table 4, the first column reports losses of foreign subsidiaries that have been 
set against domestic profits, but have not yet been subject to subsequent taxation. The 
second column reports losses that have been subject to subsequent taxation. The 
revenue raised is given in the third column.   49 
Table 4. Revenue Effects of Subsequent Taxation (in millions of euros) 
Year Potential 
subsequent 
taxation 
Losses subject 
to subsequent 
taxation 
Revenue from 
subsequent 
taxation 
1997 -7,867.65  841.74  407.19 
1998 -13,466.23  863.78  410.08 
1999 -23,258.37  1,371.78 578.89 
2000 -29,719.48  1,509.15 636.86 
2001 -42,760.39  1,895.97 500.06 
2002 -61,849.31  2,801.31 738.84 
 
It turns out that the revenue raised through subsequent taxation is between 5 
percent and 10 percent of revenue lost from border-crossing loss offsets. Therefore 
losses that can be set against domestic profits are much higher than subsequent profits. 
Those findings suggest that the introduction of subsequent taxation will not prevent 
huge revenue losses from border-crossing loss offsets. It should be taken into account 
that those results have been derived by abstracting from behavioral adjustments. It is 
clear that behavioral adjustments will further reduce the potential of subsequent taxation 
to raise revenue, at least in countries with high statutory tax rates. Parent companies 
with subsidiaries that have accumulated large losses in the past will try to avoid that 
subsequent profits will occur in the same firm. 
5 Conclusion 
The ECJ ruling in the Marks & Spencer case may force EU member countries to 
allow multinational firms to set foreign losses against domestic taxable profits. Many 
governments fear that this may give rise to considerable tax revenue losses. For 
Germany, our calculations suggest that the revenue losses may be as high as €30 billion, 
or 1.5 percent of German GDP, for the years 1998-2002. However, the reader should 
take into account our assumption that all foreign losses can be set against domestic 
profits, which requires profits of all parent companies to be sufficiently high. We have 
thus calculated what should be interpreted as an upper boundary for the revenue losses. 
Further revenue losses can be expected for the future, depending on how the EU 
member countries adjust their group relief rules to EC law. The introduction of border-
crossing group relief with subsequent taxation rules may reduce the revenue losses,   50
relative to a situation without subsequent taxation. But the calculations for our data set 
suggest that the revenue that can be raised will reduce the revenue losses from border-
crossing loss offsets by no more than 5 percent to 10 percent. Those numbers should be 
interpreted taking into account that we have abstracted from behavioural adjustments. If 
those adjustments are taken into account, it is clear that the revenue losses in countries 
with high statutory tax rates will be even higher. 
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III 
How would formula apportionment in the EU affect the 
distribution and the size of the corporate tax base?  
An analysis based on German multinationals 
1 Introduction 
For decades, proposals to coordinate corporate income taxes in the European 
Union (EU) have been largely unsuccessful because the member countries refused to 
give up national sovereignty in the field of direct taxation. But recently, at an informal 
ECOFIN meeting in September 2004, the finance ministers of the EU countries 
supported the creation of a working group dealing with corporate tax base 
harmonisation. Since November 2004 the so called Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base Working Group has started to investigate concepts for introducing a common 
European tax base. 
The most likely reason for this policy shift is that national governments in the EU 
find it increasingly difficult to tax the income of multinational corporations (MNC) in a 
satisfactory way. Next to the pressures implied by tax competition for real investment, 
countries with high tax rates increasingly observe that profits generated domestically are 
shifted to low tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing, thin capitalization and other 
income shifting techniques.TP
21
PT For some time, national governments tried to tackle this 
problem via anti tax avoidance legislation. But this legislation is increasingly 
challenged by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).TP
22
PT The fading power to tax at the 
national level may have induced governments to give up resistance against tax 
coordination at the European level. 
In its 2001 report on company taxation in the internal market, the EU commission 
proposed the introduction of a common European tax base which would be apportioned 
to the member states according to a formula which is yet to be specified.TP
23
PT Such an EU 
                                                 
TP
21
PT For a survey on the tax competition literature see Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005). A survey on the 
empirical literature on tax competition can be found in De Mooij and Ederveen (2003). Desai, Hines and 
Foley (2003) survey different studies that show empirical evidence for profit shifting. One should note 
that also losses could be shifted from low tax to high tax countries in order to reduce the tax burden.  
TP
22
PT See Persoff (2004) for a survey on the relevant ECJ rulings. 
TP
23
PT For a more detailed analysis of the advantages and shortcomings of formula apportionment   52
tax base would replace the separate accounting (SA) system for MNC.TP
24
PT While the tax 
base would be harmonized, the EU member countries would retain the right to set tax 
rates. Each country would apply the national tax rate to its share of the common tax 
base. 
An important problem that policy makers face when proposing changes to the 
national tax system is to estimate the tax revenue effects. For purely national tax 
reforms, sophisticated methods and data sources are available to estimate the revenue 
effects. But for an EU wide reform of company taxation, the available information on 
the revenue effects for the different member countries is rather limited. 
The goal of this paper is to shed some light on the possible revenue effects of an 
EU tax base with formula apportionment (FA).TP
25
PT We focus on the change of the overall 
tax base and the redistribution of tax bases between countries implied by a switch from 
SA to FA. Our analysis is based on German firm-level FDI data in combination with 
balance sheet information on the parent companies. Since German companies with 
foreign subsidiaries are legally obliged to report the balance sheet positions of 
subsidiaries to Deutsche Bundesbank, information on foreign profits, losses, property 
and sales is available. In principle, it would of course be desirable to use data from EU- 
wide and not just German MNCs. The problem is that, to the best of our knowledge, no 
EU wide data base of comparable quality is available.TP
26
PT Moreover, as we show in 
greater detail in section 2, German foreign direct investment does constitute a 
significant part of overall foreign direct investment in the EU. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the limitations of our database have to be taken into account when interpreting our 
results.  
The data is used to estimate the firm-level apportionment factors and the SA and 
FA tax bases for our sample of German multinational companies and their subsidiaries. 
Our simulation of the FA system proceeds in two steps. In the first step we only 
                                                                                                                                               
see Mintz and Weiner (2003). 
TP
24
PT The proposals discussed at the moment would allow companies to choose between the existing system 
and the EU tax base. 
TP
25
PT The term “formula apportionment” is common in the United States, while the term “formula allocation” 
is mainly used in Canada. Some authors also use “formulary apportionment”. We will use the U.S. term 
formula apportionment here. 
TP
26
PT Note e.g. that 50% of the data we use is taken from income tax statements whereas most other available 
datasets are based on financial statements. The data is described in greater detail in section 2.   53 
apportion the profits according to the formula but do not allow for border crossing loss 
offset. In the second step we add an EU-wide loss-offset.TP
27
PT This allows us to distinguish 
the impact of profit distribution according to the formula and the impact of loss offset. 
Our analysis yields the following main results: If an FA system without border 
crossing loss-offset is introduced, many smaller countries, in particular those which are 
usually considered to attract book profits under the current system, tend to lose part of 
their tax base. At the same time, the tax base of large countries increases or at least 
remains the same, compared to the SA case. Adding border crossing loss-offset to the 
FA system implies that most lose tax base. This happens because the EU wide corporate 
tax base declines. In our sample this reduction amounts to about 20 percent.TP
28
PT  
The result for the decline in the aggregate tax base should be interpreted with 
caution. This is not only because we only use data on German MNCs, which are 
unlikely to be representative of the EU as a whole. In our sample period (1996-2001) 
subsidiaries of German firms in other European countries experienced large losses, so 
that average profitability was relatively low.TP
29
PT These losses are also a reason for the tax 
base decrease when introducing an EU-wide tax base with loss-offset. It cannot be 
excluded that losses would be smaller if a longer period had been available.  
In the literature, formula apportionment has been studied in both empirical and 
theoretical contributions. But, as far as we know, this paper is the first attempt to 
investigate the revenue effects of introducing FA in Europe. Shackelford and Slemrod 
(1998) discuss the revenue effect of a unilateral introduction of international formula 
apportionment at the federal level in the U.S. They find that the tax liabilities of US 
multinationals would increase with the introduction of FA in the USA. The difference to 
our analysis is that Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) do not allow for international loss-
offset. 
                                                 
TP
27
PT For theoretical analysis of the effects of an international loss-offset see Gérard and Weiner (2003). 
TP
28
PT Note that the tax base change is the same as the tax revenue change if we assume that the tax rates 
remain unchanged. 
TP
29
PT See Weichenrieder and Ramb (2004).   54
We will not discus the theoretical arguments for and against the introduction of a 
common tax base with an FA system at length.TP
30
PT The main arguments in favour of such 
a system are the avoidance of transfer pricing rules,TP
31
PT the reduction of compliance costs 
and the simplification of tax rules for MNC.TP
32
PT The idea is that this might foster 
economic development in the European Union. This argument is put forward by the 
European Union itself and some researchers in this field.TP
33
PT On the other hand there are 
contributions that emphasize the role of incentives to avoid taxation and distortions in 
economic decisions of companies when using formula apportionment, which are not 
present in the current systems of separate accounting.TP
34
PT 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the database used in our estimations 
is presented and discussed. Section 3 describes the benchmark case with SA, and gives 
the estimations for the tax bases when SA is in place. Section 4 presents the 
characteristics of an EU tax base, while Section 5 presents the apportionment system 
that allocates a common tax base to the EU member countries. In Section 6 the 
estimation for an EU tax base is presented and compared to the results from Section 3. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 Data 
The most important prerequisite when estimating tax base effects is to find a 
representative database that contains the necessary information on corporate 
multinational companies. The calculation of the tax base effects when introducing a 
single European corporate tax base would ideally use data on all EU multinational 
companies and their foreign affiliates in Europe in order to generate precise and robust 
results. Unfortunately, a database that combines the information of parent companies 
from different EU countries and their foreign subsidiaries does not exist in Europe. 
Even on the national level most countries do not have information about domestic MNC 
                                                 
TP
30
PT There are many contributions to the literature dealing with this issue. See e. g. Gordon and Wilson 
(1986), Sorensen (2004), Mintz (1999), Weiner (1999), Mintz and Weiner (2003), Devereux (2004), 
Wellisch (2004) and Pethig and Wagener (2003). 
TP
31
PT See Riedel and Runkel (2005) for a theoretical analysis of the effect of FA in a union with respect to 
the transfer pricing activities of companies with subsidiaries in a country outside the union. 
TP
32
PT The compliance costs of international companies when dealing with the different EU tax systems have 
been analyzed by the European Commission (2004). 
TP
33
PT See Mintz (2004) and European Commission (2004). 
TP
34
PT See Gordon and Wilson (1986).   55 
that can be combined with data on the foreign subsidiaries. Our paper is a first step to 
overcome this data problem. We use German data to create a backward looking 
database using information on German MNC and their EU subsidiaries. 
The Deutsche Bundesbank carries out annual full sample surveys on inbound and 
outbound direct investment stocks based on the provisions of the Foreign Trade and 
Payments Regulation.TP
35
PT Since German companies have to report about their foreign 
investments to Deutsche Bundesbank there exists a rich database on the balance sheet 
information of the foreign subsidiaries of German MNC. We use this Micro Database 
Direct Investment (MiDi) and match it with two other data sources that give us 
information on the balance sheet information of the parent companies taken from the 
Deutsche Bundesbank’s Ustan and the Hoppenstedt databases.TP
36
PT The matching process 
combines only the parent companies with the corresponding subsidiaries where the 
identification of the parent company is available. How much of overall German FDI 
abroad is described by this new sample? Figure 1 shows the share of the firms in our 
sample in total FDI stocks of German multinational companies in the EU15 countries. 
On average, they account for around 25 percent of total German FDI in the EU15. 
The newly created database gives us a small part of the European tax base for the 
years 1996 to 2001: It allows us to balance losses and profits of German MNCs and 
their foreign subsidiaries.TP
37
PT The data restrictions allow us to do this only for MNCs 
based in Germany. But since no other database of comparable quality is available to our 
knowledge, and given that Germany is economically one of the most important EU 
countries, the data is a useful starting point for evaluating of possible tax base effects of 
a switch from SA to FA in the EU. A look at Eurostat FDI data shows that Germany`s 
share in total FDI stocks within the EU15 is about 14 percent.TP
38
PT  
                                                 
TP
35
PT See Lipponer (2003a, 2003b) and the appendix for a detailed description of the Micro Database Direct 
Investment. 
TP
36
PT See the appendix for a detailed description of the data matching. 
TP
37
PT Note that balancing profits and losses is not the same as consolidating the firm activities. Our data does 
not allow calculating a consolidation of profits. Our approach is similar to group taxation with an 
international loss-offset system. 
TP
38
PT We used Eurostat data on FDI stocks (Position 505) for the years 1996 to 2001 to calculate this 
number.   56
Figure 1: Share of the parent companies in the sample in the total EU15 FDI stocks 
of German multinational companies for the period 1996-2001 
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Next to the profits and losses we are also able to calculate the property, sales and 
the number of employees for each German MNC with subsidiaries in the EU15. Sales 
are defined as total external sales of a firm in one year including exports. The variable 
property is defined as the sum of all tangible and intangible assets of the firm. Instead of 
the payroll data used in current FA systems in Canada and the United States we only 
have information on the number of employees.TP
39
PT We use this number as a proxy for 
payroll. The profit of a firm is defined as the pre-tax profit of firms before dividends 
and after tax loss-carry forwards. We use the same positions for both the parent 
company and the subsidiary. Using the pre-tax profit is reasonable in this setting since 
we are interested in the tax base of a single firm.TP
40
PT The total assets are defined as the 
balance sheet total of the parent company. 
The analysis is based on an unbalanced panel dataset with information about 1844 
German parent companies and 5761 foreign subsidiaries.TP
41
PT The calculations are 
                                                 
TP
39
PT See the appendix for a detailed description. 
TP
40
PT While the pre-tax profit is directly available for the German parent company we only have after tax 
profits for the subsidiaries. We used the statutory tax rates to estimate the pre-tax profits of subsidiaries. 
See the appendix for details. 
TP
41
PT We exclude the agricultural sector and the public sector companies from the sample.   57 
restricted to subsidiaries in the EU15, i.e. those countries which were EU member states 
before May 2004.TP
42
PT 
Table 1 summarises the firm-level data of German firms and subsidiaries in the 
EU15 for the years 1996 to 2001. Firstly, it should be noted that the firms in the sample 
are very heterogeneous. The standard deviations are very large for most countries. The 
first column displays the mean profit of firms for each country (mprofit).TP
43
PT The mean of 
firm profits for German parent companies is at least one third higher than the mean 
profit of the affiliates in the other EU countries. Why is there a profit bias towards 
Germany? It should be noted that our panel is asymmetric with respect to the 
distribution of economic activity between Germany and the other countries. In terms of 
property, sales, and employees, the domestic activity of German parent companies is 
much larger than economic activity of subsidiaries abroad. This could explain that the 
profits reported by the parent companies are larger in absolute terms. The mean property 
in Germany (mproperty) is at least three times the size of other countries. The same is 
true for the mean of sales (msales) and the mean number of employees, which are, 
respectively, four and seven times higher in Germany than abroad.  
Not surprisingly, the absolute number of firms in the sample is also highest in 
Germany since there are many parent companies with only one or two subsidiaries in 
the EU15. We also find a large number of firms in some smaller countries like the 
Netherlands and Belgium. These countries are known as preferred locations for 
headquarters of holding companies.TP
44
PT This could be a factor explaining the high number 
of observations. The geographical neighbourhood to Germany is likely to be another 
relevant factor for the location of FDI in our sample as the high number of firms in 
Austria indicates. 
                                                 
TP
42
PT We also estimated the tax bases for the EU25 in order to check if our results are robust to variations. 
The results are available upon request from the authors. The general results do not change when using the 
EU25. The decrease in the overall tax base is slightly higher. The countries in the EU15 that lose from 
introducing an FA system do not change when we use the data for the EU25. We do not report the results 
here since for the time period available the ten countries were not part of the EU which makes a 
comparison difficult. 
TP
43
PT Note that loss carry forwards have been considered in these calculations. 
TP
44
PT The issue of the structure of holding companies in Europe is discussed by Weichenrieder (2005).   58
Table 1. The mean of profit, property, sales (in thousand Euro), and pre-tax return 
on total assets per firm for the years 1996-2001 
  mprofit  mproperty  Msales  memployees  Number 
of firms 
Austria 818 
(22.114) 
8.880 
(45.412) 
46.688 
(156.264) 
173 
(497) 
702 
Belgium 3.372 
(28.086 
11.417 
(66.109) 
71.602 
(355.387) 
156 
(778) 
427 
Denmark 245 
(6.649) 
4.344 
(16.095) 
29.076 
(69.128) 
100 
(237) 
208 
Finland 1.345 
(5.964) 
8.107 
(38.744) 
22.581 
(56.847) 
68 
(177) 
195 
France 1.050 
(49.848) 
10.427 
(52.142) 
90.259 
(653.058) 
230 
(868) 
993 
Germany 8.560 
(156.078) 
66.202 
(596.773) 
378.836 
(2.164.687) 
1686 
(9483) 
1.844 
Great 
Britain 
-10.210 
(223.247) 
17.295 
(135.137) 
80.785 
(510.215) 
245 
(1575) 
790 
Greece  -9 
(2.503) 
4.423 
(7.831) 
27.604 
(47.498) 
108 
(174) 
99 
Ireland 2.503 
(14.733) 
5.560 
(18.540) 
17.103 
(39.054) 
90 
(194) 
110 
Italy 1.999 
(14.349) 
9.551 
(43.574) 
56.082 
(243.091) 
137 
(392) 
609 
Luxemburg  -4.973 
(158.101) 
11.115 
(40.902) 
26.068 
(58.859) 
83 
(154) 
95 
Netherlands 6.954 
(162.486) 
9.834 
(53.486) 
35.800 
(102.136) 
109 
(238) 
611 
Portugal 1.267 
(10.817) 
17.314 
(84.595) 
49.121 
(189.388) 
225 
(526) 
186 
Spain 2.415 
(17.554) 
11.174 
(56.575) 
55.832 
(255.940) 
207 
(745) 
545 
Sweden 3.717 
(41.394) 
20.056 
(158.259) 
68.260 
(379.808) 
225 
(1498) 
256 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
*The negative values for these countries are due to large losses of single firms during the sample period. 
 
The descriptive statistics in table 1 clearly show that our sample is not 
representative for multinational firms in the EU as a whole. This has to be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results in the following sections. 
3  Benchmark case: Separate accounting with national loss 
offset 
The first step in our analysis is to consider the size and the distribution of the tax 
base under separate accounting (SA). This will serve as a point of reference when 
analysing an EU tax base with an FA system. We estimate the tax base by calculating   59 
the taxable profit for each firm in each country in the EU and assume that all countries 
use SA when taxing the corporate income of these firms. This also implies that there is 
no international loss-offset system in place. The taxable profits are then aggregated for 
each country. This yields what we call the national tax bases. 
The benchmark case with SA can be illustrated using the following example. A 
German company owns two firms A and B in France. While firm A earns a profit of 
100 Euro, firm B has a loss of 50 Euro. Since the two firms in France are in one group, 
we assume that they are able to consolidate their profits and losses inside France. The 
tax base in France is therefore 100 - 50 = 50 Euro. All profits of German owned firms in 
France are summed up after this national loss-offset regime.TP
45
PT This gives us the tax base 
in France for the case of SA. 
We calculate the tax base for each EU15 country in every year from 1996 to 2001 
in this way. This tax base contains only the corporate income of German FDI in the 
respective country using an SA approach. We refer to these tax bases as the distribution 
of tax bases across member countries under the current system of SA. Table 2 shows the 
sum of the tax base for each country for the years 1996 to 2001.TP
46
PT 
Generally, large countries tend to have larger tax bases in our sample than small 
countries. But there are important exceptions. The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and 
Sweden have large tax bases, too. This is a sample effect since the number of 
observations varies among countries and years. Therefore the absolute tax base is larger 
in countries with many observations. The highest number of observations is available 
for Germany. Also, as noted in Section 2 the size of the headquarters compared to 
foreign subsidiaries is large and ties profits to Germany. This is the reason why the 
German tax base is by far the largest in the sample. Note that the information revealed 
by this distribution of absolute values of tax bases is limited because it reflects the 
specific properties of our data sample, i.e. the different numbers of observations. The 
values in table 2 serve as the starting point to compare the tax base distribution under 
SA with the pattern emerging under FA. 
                                                 
TP
45
PT There are different national loss-offset regimes in the EU member states. Assuming perfect loss-offset 
across firms of one group within member countries therefore is a simplification. 
TP
46
PT The yearly tax bases are given in the appendix.   60
Table 2. The sum of the SA tax base for the EU15 countries in m. Euro for the 
years 1996-2001 
  SA Tax Base 
Austria 6.144 
Belgium 7.659 
Denmark 972 
Finland 676 
France 16.056 
Germany 114.700 
Great Britain  8.549 
Greece 379 
Ireland 1.314 
Italy 6.634 
Luxemburg 1.363 
Netherlands 21.460 
Portugal 1.923 
Spain 6.897 
Sweden 4.691 
 
4  A European tax base 
The idea of an EU tax base is to consolidate all European activities of a MNC 
according to a common set of accounting and tax rules.TP
47
PT Such a system also implies an 
EU wide loss-offset. We calculate such an EU tax base using the profits and losses of 
German parent companies and their subsidiaries in Europe. For purposes of illustration, 
assume that a German company has subsidiaries in Spain and Italy. The Spanish 
subsidiaries earn a consolidated profit of 100 Euro; the Italian firms make losses of 50 
Euro. The profit of the German parent company is 50 Euro. A common European tax 
base would allow an international loss-offset in this scenario. We then have 50 - 50 + 
100 = 100 Euro as the European tax base. The MNC’s tax base is then apportioned to 
the countries where the multinational firm is active according to indicators like the 
amount of property in a country or the sales and payroll in a country.TP
48
PT This calculation 
is made for every single firm in the sample. 
This approach to calculating a common European tax base is of course based on 
strong simplifications compared to the complex questions that arise when actually 
introducing the jurisdictional framework for the creation of an EU tax base. Firstly, 
                                                 
TP
47
PT For a detailed review of the different tax base proposals see Devereux (2004). For an analysis of the 
efficiency impacts of the Home State Taxation versus the Common Consolidated Tax Base approach see 
Mintz and Weiner (2003). 
TP
48
PT These are the usual apportionment factors as used in Canada and the US.   61 
group consolidation is more than just adding profits and losses for tax purposes.TP
49
PT 
Secondly, the EU member countries must agree on accounting standards used to 
calculate profits. Thirdly, there must be agreement on the definition and the 
measurement of the factors in the apportionment formula.TP
50
PT In so far, our approach of 
just adding profits and losses is rather crude. But it nevertheless allows to gain a first 
impression of the effects to be expected if SA is replaced by FA.  
5  The choice of apportionment factors 
The introduction of an EU tax base raises the question of how the tax base should 
be divided between the EU member countries. Debates on formula apportionment 
usually refer to three countries which use this system to allocate tax bases to subnational 
jurisdictions. These countries are the USA, Canada and Switzerland.TP
51
PT The U.S. and the 
Canadian Systems differ strongly in the method of profit allocation. In the following, 
we briefly present the U.S. and the Canadian systemsTP
52
PT and then present the formula 
used in our calculations which is a combination of the two systems. 
The tax liability  i T  of a company in a U.S. state i is given by the following 
equation 
i
i S
i
i L
i
i P
i i i S
S
L
L
P
P
t T π α α α ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + + =  (1) 
The U.S. states have the right to choose the tax rate  i t  and the weights 
j
i α  for 
each apportionment factor j, where P  stands for the total property of the firm in the 
U.S.,  L for the total payroll, and S  for the total sales. The states may also modify the 
federal tax base, so that the tax base in state i is  i π . Many states use an evenly 
weighted three-factor formula where 
1
3
i
j α = . This formula is not binding, though. The 
                                                 
TP
49
PT For instance, the tax consequences of intra group sales of assets under full consolidation may be 
different from the consequences under pure profit and loss-offset.  
TP
50
PT See e.g. Sorensen (2004). 
TP
51
PT For a detailed description of the systems in these countries see Daly and Weiner (1993). 
TP
52
PT For reasons of space, we do not describe the Swiss system which is rather complex because the formula 
used is different for different industries.   62
fact that U.S. states are allowed to change the weights 
j
i α  of each apportionment factor 
may easily lead to double taxation.TP
53
PT 
The Canadian system grants less discretion to the provinces. The regional 
governments use the same tax base Π as the federal government and set the local tax 
rate. In addition, they may give tax credits or incentives to encourage private  
investment. The tax liability in this system is given by 
Π ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + =
S
S
L
L
t T
i i
i i 2
1
2
1
, (2) 
i.e. there are only the two factors payroll and sales entering the formula.  
Note that, as pointed out by McLure (1980), a formula apportionment system has 
similar economic effects as a system imposing a tax on each single factor in the 
formula. In the case of the Canadian formula, it may be considered strange that a tax 
which supposedly taxes capital income uses only labor and sales in the formula. The 
reason for this choice of factors is that they are meant as a distribution device to allocate 
the tax base according to the economic activity of a company in one country. But it is 
not clear why factors which are more closely related to capital income like, for instance, 
property, are not included in the formula. 
In our analysis we will use a three-factor formula to apportion the tax base to the 
EU countries. We will use a weight of 
1
3  on each of the factors, i.e.  1
3
i
j α = . Since our 
data contains no payroll information for German subsidiaries we apportion income 
according to the factors sales, property and employees.TP
54
PT 
Accordingly, the tax liability of a German MNC in country i is 
Π ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + + =
E
E
S
S
P
P
t T
i i i
i i 3
1
 (3) 
                                                 
TP
53
PT See Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) for a detailed analysis of the change of apportionment weights in the 
U.S. 
TP
54
PT Since the data does provide the number of employees of a subsidiary we can use this value as a proxy 
for payroll.   63 
where P is the total property of the MNC in the EU15, S the total sales of the 
MNC, E the number of employees, and Π the taxable profit of the firm. The goal of our 
analysis is to estimate the tax base of the MNC in each country after Formula 
Apportionment. We calculate the tax base for every single MNC and sum up the firm-
level tax bases to gain information on the national tax bases each country receives. 
Figure 2 shows the mean of the apportionment factors for Germany for the years 
1996 to 2001 in our sample. Germany has the largest shares of the factors compared to 
all other European countries. The reason is again that domestic activity of German firms 
is much larger than economic activity of their European affiliates. The factors range 
between 61 and 78 percent for Germany. 
The comparison of apportionment factors for the year 1999 in the other countries 
(see Figure 3) shows that big countries like France and Great Britain have much higher 
shares in property and sales than the remaining countries.TP
55
PT Moreover, some smaller 
countries which are geographically close to Germany (Austria, Belgium, and 
Netherlands) attain almost the same factor shares as countries like Italy and Spain. 
Figure 2. Germany’s share in European property, sales and employees of German 
multinational companies 
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TP
55
PT The graphs with the shares for all years can be found in the appendix.   64
Figure 3. Country shares in European property, sales and employees of German 
multinational companies in 1999 
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6  Comparison of tax bases 
After defining the consolidated tax base and the apportionment factors we 
calculate the share of the tax base allocated to each country under FA. As noted in 
Section 3 the important information generated by this estimation is the difference in tax 
bases between FA and SA, rather than their absolute size. In the following analysis we 
will distinguish between two effects of introducing a common EU tax base with FA. 
Firstly, a redistribution of tax base arises because a given overall tax base is now 
allocated according to indicators of economic activity instead of profits as measured by 
separate accounting. The second effect is due to the introduction of border crossing loss-
offset. Most importantly, border crossing loss offset reduces the size of the EU-wide tax 
base. But it also changes the distribution of the tax base across countries. For instance, 
countries where firms are very profitable and suffer few losses will may lose a 
significant part of their tax base if domestic profits are set against foreign losses 
whereas countries where firms suffer high losses anyway will be affected less. As a first 
step, the next section focuses on the effect of introducing FA without EU-wide loss-
offset.    65 
6.1  Formula apportionment without border crossing loss-offset  
This section considers the introduction of formula apportionment without border 
crossing loss-offset.TP
56
PT The SA European tax base is calculated by adding up the SA tax 
bases in the EU15 countries for each firm. If a firm suffers losses in a country, these 
losses can be carried forward in the country but cannot be set against profits from other 
countries. Thus, effectively, only profits are added. For each firm, EU wide profits are 
then distributed across countries according to the apportionment formula discussed 
above. Consider again the simple example introduced in section 4 of a German parent 
company with subsidiaries in Italy and Spain. German profits are 50, profits in Spain 
are 100 and the Italian subsidiary makes losses of 50. We would now sum up profits and 
ignore losses of the Italian subsidiaries, so that EU wide taxable profits are 150. This tax 
base is allocated to Italy, Spain and Germany according to the apportionment formula.  
The results of this experiment are shown in table 3. The table also replicates the 
results of the SA case for comparison. It turns out that there are strong shifts in the 
national tax bases after apportionment. Six countries lose in this scenario: Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Luxemburg, Finland, and Sweden.TP
57
PT On the other hand, some 
countries in Southern Europe like Portugal and Greece win tax base, as does Austria, 
which gains significantly.TP
58
PT 
Among the large countries, all receive a larger tax base (Great Britain, Germany, 
and Spain) or obtain at least more or less the same tax base as in the SA case (France, 
Italy).  
Thus, a pattern emerges where smaller countries and especially countries known 
for offering attractive tax regimes to MNC tend to lose tax base when firm profits are 
allocated according to the apportionment factors discussed above. These results could 
be interpreted as a hint that a significant amount of income shifting is going on under 
the current SA tax system. Note that the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland lose a 
                                                 
TP
56
PT An introduction of formula apportionment without loss-offset would also be possible, though the 
discussion in Europe is mainly about FA with loss-offset. Hellerstein (2005) shows that the two elements 
can exist independently. 
TP
57
PT The change in national tax bases change varies over the years. This shows that our data is volatile with 
respect to the national tax bases. The complete graphs of the national tax base shares for the different 
scenarios can be found in the appendix.   66
particularly large part of their tax base. These countries had tax regimes during the 
sample period that offered significant tax incentives to MNCs. While Ireland had a split 
corporate tax rate with a 10 percent rate on foreign manufacturing companies and 
special tax regimes like the “Dublin Docks”, the Netherlands had attractive tax rules for 
holding companies and Belgium offered tax incentives for so called co-ordination 
centres of MNC.TP
59
PT These regimes can be used by companies to shift book profits in 
order to reduce their tax burden. It is plausible that the countries attracting these book 
profits under the SA system lose when indicators of economic activity are used for the 
allocation of the tax base.TP
60
PT Of course, low corporate tax rates as e.g. in Ireland will not 
only attract book profits but also real economic activity. But this effect should be 
reflected in increasing property, employment and sales of subsidiaries in Ireland. It 
cannot explain a loss in tax base caused by a switch from SA to FA.  
                                                                                                                                               
TP
58
PT The high values for Austria are mainly due to observations in 2001. For the other years the change is 
still positive but much smaller. The results for Portugal and Greece are based on relatively few 
observations. 
TP
59
PT The Belgium co-ordination, distribution and service centres, the Luxembourg co-ordination centres, 
Ireland split tax rate and the incentives for holding companies in the Netherlands are also mentioned and 
explained in the EU Code of Conduct on business taxation (1998). Sweden which also loses significantly 
is mentioned there with a special tax regime for insurance companies. 
TP
60
PT It should be noted that it is difficult to find empirical evidence for transfer pricing activities since firms 
obviously try to hide such activities since tax administrations would otherwise enforce taxation and fine 
companies. Nevertheless, recent research as surveyed by Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) supports the view 
that companies use profit shifting measures like transfer pricing and thin capitalization in order to avoid 
taxation in high tax jurisdictions. Our results might therefore be interpreted as another hint for profit 
shifting.   67 
Table 3. Comparison between the sum of the SA and an FA tax base without 
international loss-offset for the EU15 countries in m. Euro for the years 1996-2001 
  SA Tax Base  Formula 
Apportionment 
without Loss-
offset 
Difference  Change in 
percent 
Austria 6.144  16.793  10.649  173% 
Belgium 7.659  5.625  -2.034  -27% 
Denmark 972  1.047  75.309  8% 
Finland 676  635  -41  -6% 
France 16.056  16.129  73  0% 
Germany 114.700  121.400  6.714  6% 
Great 
Britain 8.549  13.168  4.619  54% 
Greece 379  527  148  39% 
Ireland 1.314  793 -521  -40% 
Italy 6.634  6.748  114  2% 
Luxembourg 1.363  1.114  -249  -18% 
Netherlands 21.460  7.543  -13.916  -65% 
Portugal 1.923  2.666  744  39% 
Spain 6.897  7.273  377  5% 
Sweden 4.691  3.053  -1.639  -35% 
 
6.2  Formula Apportionment and international loss-offset 
If we add the possibility of border crossing loss-offset, the overall tax base 
declines. Table 4 shows the values for the 15 countries and for the total EU tax base. 
The first result is that now most countries lose part of their tax base compared to 
the benchmark case with SA. The reason is that many foreign subsidiaries of German 
firms in EU member states suffered losses in the period between 1996 and 2001 which 
are now set against profits of other subsidiaries or the parent company.TP
61
PT This acts as a 
tax relief for the MNC, given that tax rates remain unchanged. As a result, all countries 
lose tax base except for Austria, Greece, and Portugal. When considering the countries 
where the introduction of an FA system reduces the tax base very strongly we again find 
that these are the countries with special tax regimes identified above: Netherlands (-
74%), Sweden (-57%), Ireland (-51%), and Belgium (-41%). Under SA, these countries 
receive a share in the overall tax base which is high, relative to real economic activity as 
measured by the apportionment factors property, sales and employees. When a loss-
                                                 
TP
61
PT See Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb (2005) for an analysis of losses and profits of German FDI in 
Europe. Ramb and Weichenrieder (2004) also find that German subsidiaries had significant losses in this 
period.   68
offset system is introduced these countries lose even more than the results in section 6.1 
suggested since the total allocable tax base is now smaller. 
Table 4. Comparison of the sum of the SA tax base and the FA tax base for the 
years 1996-2001 in m. Euro 
 
TSA Tax BaseT  TFA Tax BaseT  TDifferenceT  TChange in 
percentT 
Austria 6.144  13.005  6.861  112% 
Belgium 7.659  4.550  -3.109  -41% 
Denmark 972  737  -235  -24% 
Finland 676  509  -167  -25% 
France 16.056  11.011  -5.045  -31% 
Germany 114.700  95.351  -19.313  -17% 
Great Britain  8.549  7.869  -680  -8% 
Greece  379  435 56 15% 
Ireland 1.314  650  -664  -51% 
Italy 6.634  4.882  -1.752  -26% 
Luxemburg 1.363  829  -534  -39% 
Netherlands 21.460  5.481  -15.979  -74% 
Portugal 1.923  2.165  242  13% 
Spain 6.897  5.777  -1.120  -16% 
Sweden 4.691  2.004  -2.685  -57% 
TEU15T  199.400.000 155.300.000 -44.100.000  -22% 
 
Under an FA system, Germany still receives a large part of the tax base in the 
sample, but the European losses of the foreign subsidiaries reduce the German tax base 
considerably. Perhaps surprisingly, the decline in tax base for Germany (17%) is 
smaller than the decline in the EU-wide tax base, which is 22%. This pattern should not 
be overemphasized, though, because we only have information on German MNCs. It is 
likely that this biases the findings in particular for the German tax base. Table 5 shows 
the loss in the overall tax base due to border crossing loss-offset for each year in the 
sample. The decrease in the EU wide tax base fluctuates considerably. It is plausible 
that additional loss-offset possibilities have a particularly strong impact in boom years 
like 2000, where many firms make profits and EU wide losses and loss carryforwards 
can be used extensively.   69 
Table 5. Comparison of the sums of the EU wide SA tax base and the EU wide FA 
tax base for the years 1996-2001 in b. Euro 
 
TEU wide SA Tax 
BaseT 
TEU wide FA Tax 
BaseT 
TDifferenceT  TChange in 
percentT 
1996 16,12  13,02  -3,09  -19% 
1997 23,35  18,28  -5,08  -22% 
1998 24,43  19,75  -4,68  -19% 
1999 35,07  28,16  -6,91  -20% 
2000 52,60  34,90  -17,70  -34% 
2001 47,81  41,14  -6,67  -14% 
Sum 199,4  155,3  -44,1  -22% 
 
7 Conclusion 
What effects would the introduction of a common tax base with formula 
apportionment have? The calculations in this paper lead to two main results. Firstly, if 
an FA system without loss-offset is introduced, small countriTes and in particular low tax 
countries or countries with special tax incentives for MNCs, which are commonly 
thought to attract book profitsT under the current system, would lose tax base. This 
happens because, under the current SA system, these countries attract a share of the EU 
wide tax base which is higher than their share in real economic activity as measured by 
indicators like property, sales or payroll. On the other hand, larger countries tend to 
increase the share in the common tax base in an FA system without loss-offset. This 
reflects that, under the current system, the share of larger countries in the common tax 
base is small, relative to their share in economic activity. Since corporate taxes in these 
countries are high compared to the EU average, these results are consistent with the 
view that profit shifting takes place under the current tax system.  
The second key result is that if a border crossing loss-offset is added to the FA 
system there is a significant effect on the overall size of the common European 
corporate tax base. The introduction of an EU tax base with loss-offset would imply that 
the overall tax base and most national tax bases decrease. According to our calculations, 
the overall tax base declines by approximately 20 percent. If we assume that countries 
do not alter their tax rates this change is the same for the tax revenue.   70
Both findings – the redistribution of tax base across countries and the decline in 
the overall tax base – suggest that the introduction of a common EU tax base with 
formula apportioning faces formidable political and economic challenges.  
All these results, though, should be evaluated in the light of the limitations of the 
data used in this study. Our analysis is based on the data of German outward FDI in the 
EU15 and the respective German parent companies only. It is unclear to which extent 
our findings can be generalized. Furthermore, we do not consider behavioural changes 
that might take place when introducing FA. Nevertheless, our calculations give a first 
idea of how countries' tax bases and, hence, tax revenues could be affected if an EU 
corporate tax base with FA became a reality. The advantage of using German data is 
that German companies have many subsidiaries all over Europe which makes the 
dataset an imperfect but nevertheless useful tool for the approximation of overall tax 
base effects. Another more technical insight of our analysis is that there is a need for a 
European database that allows forecasting the revenue effects of such fundamental tax 
changes in greater detail. 
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9  Appendix: Data description 
FDI data 
The Deutsche Bundesbank carries out annual full sample surveys on inbound and 
outbound direct investment stocks based on the provisions of the German Foreign Trade 
and Payments Regulation. Due to this legal regulation, foreign companies with 
investments in Germany have to report balance sheet information of their German 
subsidiaries. The balance sheet data are calculated using the German accounting 
regulations. Similarly, German multinational companies have to report the same 
information about their foreign affiliates. The data is available for the years 1989 to 
2003. 
Time series for individual companies are available for the years 1996 to 2003. In 
2002, about 6.000 domestic investors filed reports on around 22.000 foreign 
subsidiaries abroad. With respect to inward FDI, in 2002 data are available for about 
10.000 affiliates in Germany, in which some 7.000 foreign investors had a participating 
interest. For a detailed description of the FDI database (MiDi), see Lipponer (2003a) 
and Lipponer (2003b). 
In order to calculate an international loss-offset regime, we only use data from 
1996 on. The panel dataset contains 1.844 German parent companies and 5.761 foreign 
subsidiaries in the EU15. This is of course a rather small amount of firms which also 
creates problems. This makes the data sensitive to small changes in the estimation 
setting. Nevertheless, the result that a decline in the EU tax base of around 20 percent 
occurs and that smaller countries tend to lose when FA is introduced are robust to 
different settings. For example we reduced the number of apportionment factors to sales 
and property where results did not change significantly. 
The subsidiaries are based in the following EU15 countries: France (F), Belgium 
(B), Netherlands (NL), Luxembourg (LUX), Italy (I), Great Britain (GB), Ireland (IRL), 
Denmark (DK), Spain (E), Sweden (S), Finland (FIN), and Austria (A). 75 Percent of 
all subsidiaries are wholly owned by the German parent company and 90 percent are 
owned with a share higher than 51 percent. The mean of the parent’s share in the   74
foreign subsidiary is 91 percent. We therefore assume for simplicity that the subsidiaries 
are all fully owned, since we have no information on other non-German shareholders.  
The most important branches of activity of the parent companies in our data set 
are Manufacturing, Holdings, Wholesale and Services to Companies. We concentrate on 
incorporated non-public companies that have either the legal form of a corporation or a 
limited liability company. Note that the fact that we observe holdings as an important 
form of German parent companies probably leads to an underestimation of the factor 
shares in Germany. The reason is that we cannot observe German subsidiaries of the 
German parent companies which would of course be part of the group. We therefore 
underestimate the tax base Germany receives in an FA system slightly. 
German firm data 
We use two datasets which we combine with the MiDi. The Ustan (Deutsche 
Bundesbank's Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics) is available from 1989 to 2001 while 
the Hoppenstedt database is available from 1996 to 2004. While Ustan contains tax and 
commercial balance sheet data, Hoppenstedt only covers commercial balance sheets of 
German corporations. Unfortunately, the data collection of Deutsche Bundesbank for 
the Ustan ends in 2001 which leads to a sharp drop in the number of German parent 
companies for the years 2002 to 2003. We therefore report only the results for the years 
1996 to 2001. A detailed description of Ustan is provided by Stoess (2001). We have 
information on the tax balance sheets for 50 percent of the parent companies. 
Matching the data 
In order to combine our dataset we use a matching procedure that adds to every 
foreign subsidiary a German parent company if an identification variable is available. If 
the parent is found in Ustan and Hoppenstedt we choose the Ustan data since it contains 
also tax balance sheets which are more appropriate for our research which aims at 
estimating tax bases on the firm level. 
The information on the number of employees is not mandatory for the 
subsidiaries. We therefore have to deal with missing data for this variable. We solve this 
problem by using two steps. Firstly, if a firm reports employees in some years but not in 
all we replace the missing by the mean of the number of employees for this year. 
Secondly, if we have no observations at all we run a simple regression where   75 
employment is the dependent variable and sales and property the explaining variables. 
This regression is used to estimate the employment data for firms without any 
information on employment. We do this in order to maximize the number of 
observations which would other wise be reduced significantly. In order to check for 
robustness we also used a two factor formula where only sales and property are used as 
apportionment factors. This did not change the results of our analysis. 
One important difference in the German data and the FDI data is the definitions of 
profit. While the data on German parent companies provides the pre-tax profits we only 
have information on the after tax profits of the foreign subsidiaries. We try to deal with 
this problem by using the statutory corporate tax rate of the host country and use it as 
multiplier in order to estimate roughly the pre-tax profit of companies. The calculation 
is simply  
()
() t p p
t
p
p
tax pre
tax pre
− =
−
=
−
−
1
1  (A1) 
where t is the statutory tax rate and p is profit. 
Yearly data for all countries 
On the two pages we added the yearly shares of the countries in the apportionment 
factors and the share in the tax base each country receives. The first figure shows the 
factors. The second figure shows the tax base shares each country receives. We 
aggregated the national SA and FA tax bases and calculated the share each country 
receives. The first column is the share in the SA tax base, the second the share in the FA 
tax base without loss-offset while the last column shows the share in the tax base for the 
FA case with formula apportionment.  
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IV 
Corporate marginal tax rate, tax loss carryforwards and 
investment functions 
– Empirical analysis using a large German panel data set 
1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the relationship between corporate investment 
behaviour and taxation has become increasingly central to economic and tax policy and 
therefore also a focus of empirical research. Against the backdrop of economic 
globalisation and the associated increase in capital mobility, corporate taxation have 
become one way for governments to compete with one another to attract investment and 
thereby create jobs. As a result of this competition, most industrialised countries have 
cut corporate tax rates, in some cases by a large margin. These reductions are generally 
financed by broadening of the tax base, with limitations in depreciation allowances and 
offsetting of tax losses at the top of the agenda.  
The extent to which investment behaviour reacts to changes in this framework is 
the subject of empirical research, which seeks to identify determinants of corporate 
investment. Devereux (2003), Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) and Devereux and 
Griffith (2003) provide a comprehensive summary of the various aspects of taxation 
(especially tax reforms). In the empirical literature, the effective marginal tax rate 
(EMTR) and effective average tax rate (EATR) proved the most suitable methods for 
analysing investment behaviour. One feature that distinguishes these methods is the 
assumption that firms turn a profit. The possibility of making a loss (and the resulting 
effective marginal tax rate of zero) is typically disregarded. One notable exception is the 
simulated marginal tax rate method developed by John R. Graham, which allows 
profitability to be explicitly modelled (Graham and Lemmon, 1998). Their approach 
explicitly accounts for tax loss offsetting, making it suitable for analysing tax reform 
measures. 
This paper will, for the first time, apply the simulated marginal tax rate method to 
data from firms resident in Germany. The data are obtained from the Bundesbank’s 
corporate balance sheet statistics, which is one of the largest set of data available for   78
research purposes in Germany. Subsequently, the suitability of this rate will be tested 
using empirical investment models. The principal conclusion of this analysis is that the 
simulated marginal tax rate method represents a complementary technique for 
determining the effects of taxation on investment behaviour.  
2 Theoretical  background 
This section provides a description of two investment models widely used in the 
empirical literature. There then follows a description of the Graham approach to 
calculating simulated marginal tax rates. 
2.1 Empirical  investment  functions 
In the empirical literature in recent years, two models have proved to be 
particularly suited to estimating investment functions. These are the Autoregressive-
Distributed-Lag (ADL) model and the Error-Correction-Model (ECM). Bond and Van 
Reenen (2003) provide a summary of the derivation and functions as well as selected 
results.  
According to the Bond and Van Reenen (2003) approach, the desired long-run 
level of the optimal capital stock should be specified as a log-linear function of output 
and the user cost of capital.  *
it k  is the logarithm of the capital stock of a firm i in period 
t,  it y  the log of output and  it j  the log of the user cost of capital. This gives the 
following function:  
t , i t , i
*
it j y c k ⋅ − + = σ  (1) 
Assuming no adjustment costs, it returns the optimal capital stock for a profit-
maximising firm with a CES production function and constant returns to scale. To 
derive an investment equation which can be estimated ( *
it k  is unobservable), the static 
model is first-differenced using the following approximation, where  t I  are investments 
and δ  the depreciation rate:   79 
∗
−
= ≈ − ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
t , i t , i
1 t
t k   k  
K
I
Δ Δ δ  (2) 
where  it k  is the observable capital stock. 
Since the transition from the current to the optimal capital stock is not fully 
completed in the current period, lag structures (distributed lags) of the type  ∗
−s t k   Δ or 
s t k   − Δ  are incorporated to allow for this. This results in a dynamic specification: 
() () ∗ = t , i t , i k   L b k   L a Δ Δ  (3) 
The capital stock for the current period t represents preceding periods (t-s), where 
a(L) and b(L) are polynomials of the lag operators. Taking into account (1) and (3), the 
generalised estimation equation for an ADL-Model is 
()() t , i
H
0 h
h t , i h
H
0 h
h t , i h i
1 t , i
t , i y   j  
K
I
ε Δ β Δ α δ + ∑ + ∑ + =
=
−
=
−
−
 (4) 
In most empirical studies, this approach is extended by incorporating cash flow 
terms. These act as measures of liquidity and enable the model to take adequate account 
of access to financial resources. 
()()
t , i
H
0 h 1 h t , i
h t , i
h
H
0 h
h t , i h
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1 t , i
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= − −
−
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−
=
−
−
 (5) 
An Error-Correction-Model (ECM) offers an alternative to the ADL approach, but 
is also derived from equation (1). In fact, the ECM is nothing more than a particular 
parametrization of an ADL-model. The difference is a partial adjustment process for the 
optimal capital stock. The gap between the desired and optimal capital stock is filled by 
a constant parameter θ .   80
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θ Δ δ  (6) 
Assuming an ADL (2,2) model, suitable reparametrisation (Bean (1981)), use of 
the approximation (2) and the inclusion of cash flow terms gives the following error 
correction model. 
() ( )
() ( ) []
() []
() t , i 2 t , i 2 1 0
2 t , i 2 1 2 1 0
2 t , i 2 1 1 t , i 1 0 t , i 0
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The corresponding empirical estimation function is 
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 (8) 
with the unobserved firm-specific effect  i η . Under these modelling conditions,  0 < θ  
is consistent with error correction in the sense that realised capital stock exceeding the 
desired level is coupled with lower future investment.  
The aim of this study is not to determine the elasticities for the user cost of 
capital.
62 Instead, it seeks to test the suitability of the approach for measuring marginal 
tax rates developed by Graham (1996a, 1996b). From this point forward, this study shall 
assume that all effects incorporated in the user cost of capital besides the tax rate and 
offsetting of losses (including, inter alia, the tax system, depreciation allowances and 
interest rates) are identical for all firms and can therefore be represented by time 
dummies in the empirical analysis. Hence, the simulated marginal tax rates are the sole 
cause of firm-specific variation. Given that cuts in the tax rate are frequently associated 
                                                 
62 See, inter alia, the studies by Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) and Harhoff and Ramb (2001).   81 
with a deterioration in methods of offsetting depreciation allowances, this will be 
helpful when interpreting the estimated parameters later. 
2.2  Simulating corporate marginal tax rates 
In most industrialised countries, the past two decades were marked by corporate 
tax reform. The average tax rate has fallen from 48% at the start of the 1980s to 35% by 
the end of the 1990s. One-third of EU member states have brought their statutory tax 
rate below 30% during the last 10 years. The lower tax rates were frequently funded by 
broadening the tax base. Generally, depreciation allowances have become less 
generous.
63 However, the restrictions imposed on methods of offsetting loss were 
virtually disregarded.  
A hallmark of most methods used to quantify tax reform measures is their 
assumption that the firms are profitable. Determining the various procedures for 
quantifying the tax burden presupposes that the firms turn a taxable profit. These 
methods generally disregard the fact that, for firms making a loss or those where tax 
loss carryforwards exceed taxable revenue, the model depend on loss carryforward.
64 
Graham (1996a, 1996b) addressed this issue and developed a method that explicitly 
takes tax loss offsetting into account. It is known as the simulated marginal tax rate. 
There now follows a brief summary of his method. 
Calculating the simulated marginal tax rate requires a model of future income. 
This is obtained from a statistical forecast of the future tax assessment basis, where 
taxable income (TI) follows a random walk.
65 In line with expectations, TI  is defined 
as the sum of  1 t TI −  and a random innovation  t ε  at time t .
66 
Fehler! Es ist nicht möglich, durch die Bearbeitung von Feldfunktionen 
Objekte zu erstellen. (9) 
                                                 
63 See Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002), Devereux and Griffith (2003) and also Gordon, 
Kalambokidis and Slemrod (2004) for a summary of how to quantify tax reform measures. 
64 The Devereux (1989) study is an exception. 
65 As well as the simplified assumption of a random walk used here, other factors affecting future income 
can also be identified, such as indebtedness and the likelihood of insolvency. For simplicity, I have 
chosen to omit them here. 
66 For a precise description of the technique using an example, see Graham and Lemmon (1998) and 
Shelvin (1990).   82
The random innovation  t ε  is found from a normal distribution with a mean 
calculated from the historical rate of revenue growth and a standard deviation based on 
the deviation in historical revenue. Based on these assumptions, estimates are calculated 
over the period  1 t TI +  to  n t TI + , where n denotes the maximum permitted period for 
tax loss carryforwards. The net present value of the firms’ tax liabilities is determined 
based on the historical TI  from  1 t −  and  2 t −  as well as the forecasts for the 
following 20 periods
67 ( 1 t +   to  20 + t ). In a second stage, the net present value of the 
firms’ tax liabilities is recalculated based on the same information from  2 t −  to  20 t +  
except that, this time, one euro is added to each TI  in t. The net present value of the 
firms’ tax liabilities with the added euro corresponds to the marginal tax rate at time t .  
The innovation  t ε  denotes the level of uncertainty for the future TI . To ensure 
that both positive and negative income shocks are possible, the marginal tax rate 
simulation is repeated 50 times.
68 The arithmetic mean of all the simulation results 
incorporates a possible spectrum of future environmental conditions (distributions). 
Using this method, the income and marginal tax rates are usually identical for firms 
which are profitable throughout the period covered by the analysis. However, it is a 
different story for firms making a loss: their marginal tax rate is lower than the 
corresponding income tax rate. Among other factors, this is attributable to the 
estimations of future TI   which, depending on past distributions, might be negative for 
some firms.  
In accordance with the procedure described here, the simulated marginal tax rates 
were calculated for a data set of firms resident in Germany. The descriptive results and 
the suitability of these rates for empirical investment functions are discussed below.  
3  Data, the tax framework and descriptive evidence 
In the empirical analysis, particular attention must be paid to the construction of, 
and assumptions made for, the measure of the tax burden described above. First, the 
data set must include a sufficient number of firms with tax loss carryforwards. Second, 
                                                 
67 Empirical models typically use a forecast for a 20-year period. 
68 The simulation may be repeated infinitely. However, empirical analysis shows that more frequent 
simulations do not yield any major changes in the average marginal tax rate.   83 
estimating plausible regression coefficients presupposes that the tax framework for the 
offsetting of losses ought to change during the observation period. Third, a meaningful 
estimate of a firm’s future earnings requires a sufficiently large number of observations. 
These three points impose greater requirements on any potential data set. For Germany, 
only the Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet statistics make the grade. 
3.1  Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet statistics 
This study is based on the Bundesbank's corporate balance sheet statistics. From 
1964 to 1998, the Bundesbank collected financial statements via its branches for non-
financial corporations in Germany in connection with its rediscount business. Overall, 
the statistics comprise approximately 70,000 financial statements from households and 
corporations for each year over this period.
69 Since the beginning of monetary union in 
1999, the Bundesbank has collected financial statements in connection with an analysis 
of the creditworthiness of eligible assets. This duty is laid down in Article 18.1 of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks, whereby national central banks must 
ensure that lending is based on adequate collateral. However, owing to these more 
stringent credit rating requirements, the number of financial statements fell from 36,000 
in 1999 to around 21,000 in 2003.
70 This significant decline in the sample size reduced 
the analytical potential of the microdata set. In particular, selection bias is likely to have 
occurred, as the sample tends to include larger firms and those with a high credit 
rating.
71 A panel data set for the 1971-2002 period is currently available for research 
purposes.
72 
3.2  Underlying tax conditions for loss offsetting 
The empirical analysis is focused on corporations resident in Germany. The tax 
framework in Germany for the relevant taxes (corporation tax on retained and 
distributed profits, solidarity surcharge, average trade tax collection multipliers) and the 
provisions related to the offsetting of losses will be discussed here. Between 1971 and 
                                                 
69 A complete account of the statistics including the methodology can be found in Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1998) and Stöss (2001). 
70 For details of the methodology, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2004). 
71 An analysis of small and medium-sized firms using this data was conducted in Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2003). The problem of selection bias was one reason why a new micro data set was created; see 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2005).   84
2002 (the period under review), there were two changes to the German tax system. A 
classical tax system following the US model with a split rate of corporation tax, with 
double taxation at shareholder level, was in effect between the end of World War II and 
1976. From 1977 to 2000, a full imputation system with a split rate of corporation tax 
was in place, which meant no double taxation. A classical tax system, which uses a 
shareholder relief system to reduce the level of double taxation at shareholder level, was 
reinstated in 2001. 
Table 1 shows the change in corporation tax rates and the solidarity surcharge 
over time. The early 1990s brought frequent tax reforms, which were characterised by a 
marked decline in the rate of corporation tax and, with the introduction of the solidarity 
surcharge, also synonymous with an additional tax burden on firms. The increase in the 
average trade tax collection multiplier began to slow in the early 1990s and actually 
reversed from 2000 onwards. 
                                                                                                                                               
72 This data set may be used by German and foreign researchers (for research purposes) subject to certain 
conditions.   85 
Table 1. Development of tax rates in Germany 
 Corporation 
tax 
retained 
profits 
Corporation 
tax 
distributed 
profits 
Solidarity 
surcharge 
Average 
trade tax 
collection 
multiplier 
1970 1976  51%  15%  /  283 to 319 
1977-1989  56%  36%  /  322 to 362 
1990 50%  36% / 364 
1991-1992  50%  36%  3.75%  363 to 370 
1993-1994 50%  36%  /  371-372 
1995-1997 45%  30%  7.5%  373-387 
1998 45%  30%  5.5%  390 
1999-2000 40%  30%  5.5%  389 
2001-2002  25%  25%  5.5%  385 to 386 
2003 26.5%  26.5%  5.5% 387 
2004-2006 25%  25%  5.5%  387 
Sources: Federal Finance Ministry for corporation tax rates and solidarity surcharge. Federal Statistical 
Office for the average trade tax collection multiplier. 
 
The process of tax loss carryback is regulated in section 10(d) of the Income Tax 
Act (Einkommensteuergesetz). The legal basis for the inter-temporal deduction of losses 
is the principle of fairness in the tax system and, especially, that of taxing financial 
performance (Homburg, 2005). Offsetting tax losses can be broadly split into four 
components: the duration and volume of the carryforward and the duration and volume 
of the carryback. The legal provisions governing these components were tightened in 
the period under review. Table 2 provides a summary of events. The rules on loss 
carrybacks have been toughened considerably, especially since 2000. By contrast, 
carryforward options have only been restricted since the start of 2004. The primary aim 
of the regulations in place since then has been to prevent firms from reducing the tax 
burden on their pre-tax profit to zero by deducting losses carried forward.   86
Table 2. Tax offsetting in Germany 
 Carryback 
period 
Carryback volume 
1970-1975 Not  permitted  0 
1976-1983  1 year  DM 5 million 
1984-1999  2 years  DM 10 million 
2000  1 year  2 million 
2001-present  1 year  1 million 
 
 Carryforward 
period 
Carryforward volume 
1970 – 1983  5 years  Unlimited 
1984 – 2003  Unlimited  Unlimited 
2004-present Unlimited  Unlimited 
(max. 60% of taxable 
income may be offset) 
 
3.3 Descriptive  evidence 
The first step of the descriptive analysis will look at selected variables to describe 
the data set used. The data was first constrained to ensure conformity with the 
applicable conditions. The empirical analysis only uses data from corporations for 
which at least three consecutive observations are available during the period under 
review and which are outside the financial or public sector. The reason the data is 
restricted to corporations is that the corporate balance sheet statistics do not give details 
about the owners, which are required for calculating the tax burden. Public sector and 
financial corporations are omitted because both groups are under-represented (banks 
and insurance companies are entirely absent, for instance) and because different rules 
typically apply for determining the tax base.   87 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Lower 10th 
percentile 
Median Upper  10th 
percentile 
Employees          
1980 346  4,315  6 40  330 
1990 361  4,686  6 40  355 
2000 544  6,614  6 53  569 
Total assets           
1980 35 434  0 3 24 
1990 41 573  1 3 30 
2000 143  2256  1  6 115 
Turnover         
1980 49 522  1 5 43 
1990 54 634  1 6 50 
2000 131  1696  1 10  119 
Cash flow           
1980 2.33  32.38 0.00  0.18  2.02 
1990 3.40  56.59 0.00  0.20  2.79 
2000 12.02  254.28 0.00  0.35  7.98 
Pre-tax profit           
1980 2 30  0 0 1 
1990 2 33  0 0 2 
2000 8 166  0 0 6 
Loss carried 
forward 
        
1980 2.07  24.69 2.35  0.11  0.01 
1990 1.53  16.02 1.77  0.10  0.01 
2000 8.67  68.17  10.13  0.31  0.01 
Dividends        
1980 1.93  14.96 0.01  0.12  1.85 
1990 2.48  19.90 0.01  0.14  2.30 
2000 13.88  132.40 0.03  0.42  11.30 
Capital ratio           
1980 0.18  0.17 0.03  0.13  0.39 
1990 0.16  0.18 0.01  0.11  0.37 
2000 0.21  0.21 0.02  0.15  0.49 
All values were deflated using the GDP price index (base year: 1995). Figures for balance sheet total, 
turnover, cash flow, pre-tax profit, loss carried forward and dividends are in millions. Statistical 
calculations of firms’ dividends and losses carried forward only where applicable. The deflated variables 
are also used in the multivariate analysis.  
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Table 3 gives an indication of the structure and quality of the data used. The 
statistics on the number of employees, the total asses and turnover show that small, 
medium-sized and large enterprises are represented in the data set. They also show that, 
on average, the firms expanded between 1980 and 1990. The rise in the indicators for 
the year 2000 is attributable to the change in the data collection method discussed in 
section 3.1. Hence, a robustness check is required in the multivariate analysis for the 
period post-1997 to detect potential selection bias towards large and successful 
corporations. Furthermore, table 3 indicates that more than 10% of the corporations 
made a pre-tax profit. A sharp rise in tax loss carryforwards can be detected from 2000 
onwards. This may be due to selection bias. On the other hand, the rise can also be 
explained by the special effects that occurred in 2000, which represented the final 
opportunity to offset disposal losses from equity holdings against tax. A closer analysis 
of a sample which is included in the data set throughout the period under review 
(balanced panel) supports the latter explanation.  
Table 4 shows a breakdown of firms by size. The categories used are as defined 
by the EU (European Commission, 2003). Small enterprises are defined as having fewer 
than 50 employees and turnover not exceeding €10 million or fewer than 50 employees 
and an annual total assets not exceeding €10 million. Medium-sized enterprises have 
between 50 and 250 employees and turnover of between €10 million and €50 million or 
between 50 and 250 employees and a total assets of between €10 million and €43 
million. Table 4 illustrates that all size categories were adequately represented. The 
proportion of small enterprises remained constant between 1980 and 1990. Over the 
same period, the share of medium-sized enterprises increased. Since the change in 
methodology, however, the share of small enterprises has fallen considerably. This has a 
detrimental effect on the representativeness of the sample and will be taken into account 
at subsequent stages of the empirical analysis. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
overall sample is characterised by a large number of entry and exits throughout the 
panel. For example, the total number of small enterprises that were part of the sample 
during the observation period amounted to around 95,000.    89 
Table 4. Number of firms and observations by size 
 Small 
enterprises 
Medium-
sized 
enterprises 
Large 
enterprises 
1980 25,066 
(62.32%) 
3,219 
(8.00%) 
11,934 
(29.67%) 
1990 29,054 
(62.28%) 
6,243 
(13.38%) 
11,350 
(24.33%) 
2000 12,313 
(48.72%) 
5,545 
(21.94%) 
7,416 
(29.34%) 
1971-2002 95,088  22,428  43,166 
 
It is crucial for the purposes of this study that the sample includes a sufficient 
number of firms with losses and tax loss carryforwards. Table 5 indicates the number of 
observations, the number of firms and the respective percentage share of firms with a 
negative pre-tax result, arranged by size. Overall, around two-thirds of the small 
enterprises (61,000 out of 95,000) made a pre-tax loss in the period under review. 
Approximately one-third of these firms reported a negative pre-tax result for only one 
year. As much as 17 per cent of small enterprises reported a negative result in five or 
more years. In terms of the frequency with which they post losses, medium-sized and 
large enterprises are very similar. Just under 25 per cent made a loss in only one year. 
At over 25 per cent, the share of firms posting a loss in more than four years is notably 
higher than for small enterprises.    90
Table 5. Number of periods with a negative pre-tax result (1971 to 2002) 
 Small  enterprises  Medium-sized 
enterprises 
Large enterprises 
  Obs. Firms Obs. Firms Obs. Firms 
1 124,267 
(26.08%) 
19,697 
(31.81%) 
21,817 
(21.09%) 
3,769 
(23.85%) 
48,201 
(19.99%) 
7,573 
(24.95%) 
2 100,207 
(21.03%) 
14,803 
(23.91%) 
19,569 
(18.91%) 
3,278 
(20.74%) 
41,035 
(17.02%) 
6,242 
(20.56%) 
3 76,646 
(16.08%) 
10,294 
(16.63%) 
16,131 
(15.59%) 
2,560 
(16.20%) 
36,240 
(15.03%) 
4,950 
(16.31%) 
4 56,546 
(11.87%) 
6,377 
(10.30%) 
12,396 
(11.98%) 
1,909 
(12.08%) 
30,107 
(12.49%) 
3,591 
(11.83%) 
≥5 118,845 
(24.94%) 
10,745 
(17.35%) 
33,558 
(32.43%) 
4,290 
(27.14%) 
85,549 
(35.48%) 
7,999 
(26.35%) 
Total  476,511 61,916 103,471 15,806 241,132 30,355 
 
Losses from preceding periods – known as loss carryforwards – are also relevant 
when assessing a firm’s pre-tax result (see table 6).
73 Approximately one-third of all 
firms (regardless of size) have carried a loss forward at least once during the period 
under review. Although the figures reveal no difference between the groups for firms 
with a loss carryforward in one year, medium-sized and large enterprises are far more 
likely to have carried a loss forward over more than four years (around 25% of them). It 
is possible to derive from tables 5 and 6, therefore, that large and medium-sized firms 
post losses far more frequently and carry losses forward for a somewhat longer time. It 
should be remembered, however, that tax regulations covering loss carrybacks may 
already suffice to prevent small firms from having to carry losses forward. 
                                                 
73 For a precise assessment, loss carrybacks would also need to be considered. However, this empirical 
analysis only includes current financial statements, not corrected ones from the previous year.    91 
Table 6. Number of periods with tax carryforwards (1971 to 2002) 
 Small  enterprises  Medium-sized 
enterprises 
Large enterprises 
  Obs. Firms Obs. Firms Obs. Firms 
1 71,708 
(31.40%) 
10,039 
(34.25%) 
14,075 
(29.67%) 
2,313 
(31.12%) 
31,789 
(26.45%) 
4,370 
(30.32%) 
2 42,620 
(18.66%) 
6,205 
(21.17%) 
8,521 
(17.96%) 
1,437 
(19.33%) 
19,435 
(16.17%) 
2,739 
(19.00%) 
3 32,424 
(14.20%) 
4,598 
(15.69%) 
5,762 
(12.15%) 
987 
(13.28%) 
14,591 
(12.14%) 
1,974 
(13.70%) 
4 21,950 
(9.61%) 
2,732 
(9.32%) 
4,468 
(9.42%) 
708 
(9.53%) 
11,189 
(9.31%) 
1,383 
(9.60%) 
≥5 59,661 
(26.13%) 
5,737 
(19.57%) 
14,617 
(30.81%) 
1,988 
(26.75%) 
43,192 
(35.93%) 
3,946 
(27.38%) 
Total 228,363  29,311 47,443 7,433 120,196  14,412 
 
On its own, however, the number of firms does not provide the full picture 
regarding the relevance of the negative effect of government tax revenue losses. Table 7 
shows the sum total of loss carryforwards by size grouping for the years 1980, 1990 and 
2000. The sum total of all losses carried forward by small firms rose from €440 million 
in 1980 to €2.3 billion in 2000. As the number of small firms declined over that period, 
the magnitude of the loss carryforwards per firm has risen significantly. Among large 
firms, the total increased more markedly, from €3.6 billion to just under €20 billion.
74 
                                                 
74 Assuming that firms post profits of a similar amount, corporation tax losses can be calculated by 
multiplying these figures by the tax rate.   92
Table 7. Revenue relevance of loss carryforwards (values in millions) 
 Small 
enterprises 
Medium-
sized 
enterprises 
Large 
enterprises 
1980 -440.31  -295.83  -3,589.19 
1990 -704.08  -399.40  -4,100.68 
2000 -2,360.19  -1,644.03  -19,883.97 
 
The effective marginal tax rates (calculated according to the Graham method) are 
central to this empirical study. These were determined using a simulation program I 
developed based on the method outlined in section 2.2 and using the data presented 
above.
75 Figure 1 illustrates the average effective marginal tax rates according to 
Graham. Marginal tax rates are highest for medium-sized firms throughout the 
observation period. This is attributable to the results of the descriptive analysis, which 
found that, in comparison, these firms post losses more rarely and carry forward lower 
losses. By contrast, marginal tax rates are lowest for small enterprises. This is surprising 
given that it is also the group with the smallest losses and loss carryforwards; however, 
the relative size of the losses and loss carryforwards provides the explanation. If the 
annual pre-tax profit is low in comparison with the current tax carryforwards, then the 
marginal tax rate is lower than the income tax rate as a result. As the discrepancies 
between the groups are minor, the groups will not be evaluated separately in the 
following multivariate analysis.
76 
                                                 
75 The program was programmed in Stata; a copy may be obtained from the author on request. 
76 The multivariate analysis was also carried out for the individual size categories. Here, too, there were 
no discernible differences between the groups.   93 
Figure 1. Graham’s effective marginal tax rates by size 
 
 
4  Marginal tax rate in empirical investment functions 
The multivariate analysis investigates the suitability of Graham's marginal tax rate 
in empirical investment functions. Two model types have come to the fore in the 
empirical literature in recent years: the more reduced-form Autoregressive-Distributed-
Lag (ADL) model and the somewhat more structural-form Error-Correction-Model 
(ECM). Typically, these studies have focused on the elasticity of the user cost of capital 
as a determinant for investment behaviour; it is particularly relevant to monetary 
transmission.
77 The present analysis disregards both the interest-rate channel and 
methods of offsetting depreciation. Instead, it centres on the applicable marginal tax rate 
given expected pre-tax earnings (including loss-offsetting). I shall only discuss the 
additional explanatory variables used in the models with reference to their sign and 
magnitude. 
                                                 
77 For Germany, empirical evidence indicates an elasticity of around 0.3 (Harhoff and Ramb, 2001). 
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4.1 Econometric  results 
First, the marginal tax rate is inserted into an ADL model; equation (6) is 
estimated using fixed effects
78 and GMM.
79 The results can be found in table 8, the 
number of lag lengths used having been determined iteratively.
80 In the simple fixed 
effects estimation, the turnover, cash-flow and lagged endogenous variables all have the 
correct sign and are of an economically plausible magnitude.The long-run coefficients 
are comparable with those from other studies (Harhoff and Ramb, 2001). As expected, 
the contemporaneous and lagged variables for the marginal tax rate were negative. The 
long-run coefficient of 0.028 is highly significant, yet it seems comparatively low. The 
test statistics for autocorrelation indicate a higher-order autoregressive process.  
As there may be a correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and the 
disturbance term, the fixed effects estimation is distorted.
81 Hence, the same 
specification was also estimated using a GMM model, considerably altering the results. 
The autocorrelation tests and the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions direct us to 
the correct choice of specification for the autoregressive structure and instruments. A 
negative sign is expected for the lagged endogenous variable, which reflects the process 
of adjustment to the optimal capital stock. However, the lagged endogenous variable 
has the wrong sign and the long-run coefficients for turnover and the marginal tax rate 
appear implausibly high. 
For large panel data sets (time and cross-section dimension), this phenomenon is 
not surprising because the high heterogeneity in the data can cause such distortions in 
the results.
82 The econometric literature proposes two possible solutions for this 
problem. One option is to use smaller samples which, for this data set, could be 
achieved by conducting sector-specific analyses, for example. The second approach 
tends to be more methodical in nature, requiring the statistical features of longer panel 
                                                 
78 All fixed effects estimations were calculated using the first-difference estimation approach. 
Asymptomatically, this leads to the same results as the “within” estimation approach. 
79 The random effects estimation procedure proved unsuitable. The null hypothesis of the Hausmann test 
(i.e. no correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables) was rejected. 
80 The optimal lag lengths are determined by excluding insignificant lags. 
81 Known as the Nickell bias. 
82 For a discussion of this effect see Kiviet and Philips (1993).   95 
data series.
83 When using only long data series, the inclusion of a lagged endogenous 
variable is of secondary importance. It can be shown that a simple fixed effects 
estimation is consistent and unbiased. 
Table 8. Results of the ADL model 
 Fixed  effects  GMM 
Lag investment / 
capital   -0.427 
(0.005) 
*** 0.079 
(0.010) 
*** 
Turnover (t) 
0.102 
(0.007) 
*** 0.435 
(0.092) 
*** 
(t-1) 
0.090 
(0.008) 
*** 0.200 
(0.071) 
*** 
(t-2) 
0.031 
(0.008) 
*** 0.113  (0.074) 
(t-3) 0.006  (0.006)  0.034  (0.077) 
Marginal tax rate (t) 
-0.021 
(0.001) 
*** -0.109 
(0.029) 
*** 
(t-1) 
-0.015 
(0.002) 
*** -0.072 
(0.018) 
*** 
(t-2) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
*** -0.045 
(0.013) 
*** 
Cash flow / capital 
(t)  0.126 
(0.005) 
***  0.067 (0.037)  * 
(t-1) 
0.095 
(0.005) 
*** 0.068 
(0.021) 
*** 
(t-2) 
0.019 
(0.004) 
***  0.037 
(0.013) 
*** 
(t-3) 
0.009 
(0.003) 
*** 0.061  (0.027)  **
Static long-run coefficients   
Turnover 0.161  (0.016) 
*** 
0.678 (0.259) 
*** 
Marginal tax rate  -0.028  (0.003) 
*** 
-0.210 (0.068) 
*** 
Cash flow / capital  0.174  (0.007) 
*** 
0.220 (0.065) 
*** 
Test AR 1  -22.72 [0.000] **  -25.48 [0.000] ** 
Test AR 2  -30.48 [0.000] **  1.374 [0.169] 
Sargan test  /  96.05 [0.081] 
Firms / Observations  22,689 / 99,601  22,689 / 99,601 
Standard deviations of the estimated coefficients in parentheses (*** significant at the 1%, ** significant 
at the 5%, * significant at the 10% level). p-values for autocorrelation and Sargan tests in parentheses. All 
regressions include a dummy for a loss carryforward and a full set of time dummies. Instruments for the 
GMM estimation are lag 2 and lag 3 of the endogenous variable “investment in capital stock in the 
preceding period” and the explanatory variables “turnover growth”, “growth rate of marginal tax rate” 
and the ratio of cash flow to capital stock in the preceding period.  
 
                                                 
83 In autoregressive panel data models, the Nickell bias lessens the longer the data series (see, for 
example, Arellano, 2003).   96
Table 9. Results of the ADL model (robustness check) 
 Fixed  effects  GMM 
Lag investment / 
capital -0.418 
(0.013) 
*** 0.100 
(0.026) 
*** 
Turnover (t) 
0.101 
(0.018) 
*** 0.270 
(0.108) 
*** 
(t-1) 
0.075 
(0.022) 
*** 0.087 
(0.028) 
*** 
(t-2) -0.001  (0.021)  -0.002  (0.028) 
(t-3) -0.007  (0.016)  0.023  (0.020) 
Marginal tax rate 
(t) -0.017 
(0.003) 
*** -0.051  (0.024)  **
(t-1) 
-0.014 
(0.004) 
***  -0.021 (0.010)  **
(t-2) -0.004  (0.003)  -0.013  (0.006)  **
Cash flow / capital 
(t) 0.156 
(0.023) 
*** 0.002  (0.075) 
(t-1) 
0.109 
(0.017) 
***  0.068 (0.045) 
(t-2) 0.014  (0.015)  0.053  (0.037) 
(t-3) 0.004  (0.013)  -0.050  (0.050) 
Static long-run 
coefficients 
  
Turnover 0.119  (0.041) 
*** 
0.254 (0.121) 
*** 
Marginal tax rate  -0.025  (0.006) 
*** 
-0.103 (0.038) 
*** 
Cash flow / capital  0.199  (0.029) 
*** 
0.025 (0.056) 
Test AR 1  -8.455 [0.000] **  -13.23 [0.000] ** 
Test AR 2  -12.12 [0.000] **  -0.1344 [0.893] 
Sargan test    110.3 [0.657] 
Firms / Observations  1340 / 14757  1340 / 14757 
Standard deviations of the estimated coefficients in parentheses (*** significant at the 1%, ** significant 
at the 5%, * significant at the 10% level). p-values for autocorrelation and Sargan tests in parentheses. All 
regressions include a dummy for a loss carryforward and a full set of time dummies. Instruments for the 
GMM estimation are lag 2 and lag 3 of the endogenous variable “investment in capital stock in the 
preceding period” and the explanatory variables “turnover growth”, “growth rate of marginal tax rate” 
and the ratio of cash flow to capital stock in the preceding period.  
The robustness check used a subsample of firms which had been included in the 
sample for at least 15 consecutive years. Table 9 lists the results for the fixed effects and 
GMM estimations.
84 The results of the fixed effects estimation differ only negligibly 
from those for the sample as a whole. By contrast, the GMM estimation is marked out 
by smaller long-run coefficients and insignificant parameters for the cash-flow term. 
This is due, in part, to the structure of the data. The subsample is characterised by larger 
                                                 
84 The number of observations included in the estimations is less than 15 as, owing to lag formation and 
the instruments, the initial observations are not part of the estimation.   97 
firms, which tend to have lower cash flow sensitivity than small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  
Besides the ADL model, the empirical literature often uses the more structural 
Error-Correction-Model (equation 10).
85 Table 10 summarises the results obtained using 
such a model. Following the method used for an ADL model, step one is a fixed effects 
estimation, step two a GMM estimation and step three a fixed effects estimation for a 
robust subsample.  
The fixed effects estimation for the entire sample provides plausible and 
significant coefficients for the lagged endogenous variable, turnover growth and the 
cash flow variable. The second lagged variable for the logarithm of turnover should be 
viewed as a test of constant returns to scale. The fact that the coefficients are significant 
supports this hypothesis. According to the model derivation (see equation 9), the long-
run coefficient for the marginal tax rate is expressed by () 010 . 0 2 1 0 = + + γ γ γ .
86 
However, the positive sign contradicts the expected coefficient which, theoretically, 
should be negative. Although the GMM estimation provides plausible values for these 
coefficients, they are very low. Furthermore, the lagged endogenous variable (which 
reflects the speed of adjustment) bears the wrong sign. Using a subsample with firms for 
which at least 15 observations are available and estimating a fixed effects model does 
not alter the result obtained using the full sample.  
                                                 
85 Empirical results for Germany may be found in Harhoff and Ramb (2001).  
86 This is the coefficient for log marg tax rate (t-2) in table 10.  
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4.2 Discussion 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first empirical study for 
Germany to test marginal tax rates calculated using the Graham method in investment 
models. Below, I shall discuss the suitability of the marginal tax rate for the empirically 
estimated investment models. I shall not offer a detailed interpretation of the other 
variables used in the estimations, but merely check their plausibility. Generally, it holds 
that the Graham method marginal tax rate can be meaningfully interpreted, in one of the 
investment models. However, it appears that the method can only be applied when 
specific conditions concerning the data structure and estimation technique are fulfilled. 
The ADL model provides plausible and significant results for the marginal tax 
rate and the other explanatory variables. The results indicate that the long-run elasticity 
of the marginal tax rate to investment activity is between 0.1 and 0.2. However, the 
larger the firm, the lower the elasticity. Provided we ignore the taxation paradox 
described in the literature, the results appear entirely plausible from a theoretical 
standpoint. Although the probability of making losses (see also the descriptive analysis) 
and therefore being subject to a lower tax rate (or, in extreme cases, a zero rate) 
increases the larger the firm, its relevance to investment activity is only minor. From an 
econometric perspective, the GMM estimation of the simple fixed effects estimation is 
preferable. While the fixed effects estimation for the subsample shows less of a Nickell 
bias, the endogeneity problem remains for the right-hand side variables. The fact that 
the GMM estimation parameters are far more significant for the entire sample is due to 
the large sample size. Given that there are plausible reasons to explain the varying 
results obtained for the much smaller subsample, the GMM estimation can be said to 
provide efficient, consistent results.  
The literature notes that the sign in front of the estimated coefficient for the 
expected marginal tax rate is generally undetermined. If a firm anticipates being taxed at 
a higher rate, it may be well-advised to boost its investment activity to benefit from the 
positive effects of methods used to offset depreciation. This is known as the taxation 
paradox and results in a positive tax rate effect on investment. The extent to which this 
applies to the present data set can be tested by modifying the specifications. One option 
is to divide the data set into periods of time subject to different depreciation rates.   100
However, as a change was not made to the depreciation rate for machinery and 
equipment until 2001, it is not possible to attempt this with the available data set. 
Option two rests on the notion that the taxation paradox has a greater impact on 
profitable firms with a lower level of indebtedness (share of outside capital). Intuitively, 
a higher tax rate increases the present value of depreciation allowances (positive effect) 
and reduces future net income (negative effect). In firms with low net earnings marked 
by low indebtedness and low tax-deductible interest payments, the first effect 
predominates.
87 An ADL model estimation (using interaction terms) was conducted 
separately for profitable and non-profitable firms as part of the empirical analysis. The 
results are not listed in a table because the results did not detect a statistically significant 
difference between the two groups. This should be taken as an indication that the 
taxation paradox has only a slight bearing on this data set.  
Results for the marginal tax rate from the more structural Error-Correction-Model 
are surprisingly unsatisfactory. Although the short-term parameters bear the correct 
sign, the parameters for the long-run relationship do not allow for meaningful 
interpretation. Theoretically, one would anticipate a negative correlation between the 
expected marginal tax rate and investment activity over the long term as well. One 
reason for the unsuitability of this type of model might be the rigid structure of the 
theoretical model; another, perhaps, an omitted variable bias. As the output and cash-
flow variables have the correct sign and are significant, it is more likely that the 
construction of the marginal tax rate is unsuitable and not that the model specification is 
fundamentally flawed.  
5  Summary and outlook 
This study is the first empirical analysis of the relationship between the 
investment behaviour of firms and Graham's empirically developed simulated marginal 
tax rates. The principal idea behind these simulated marginal tax rates is to take account 
of the expected earnings situation and, hence, explicit inclusion of the intertemporal 
offsetting of tax losses. Hence, this approach differs from others frequently used in the  
                                                 
87 See, for example, Sinn (1987) and Weichenrieder (1995).   101 
literature, which typically assume firms are profitable. The traditional approaches 
disregard the fact that firms posting losses are taxed at a zero rate and, in addition, are 
able to carry these losses forward to another period. Given resident firms’ increasing 
losses and loss carryforwards, this aspect isrelevant, however. The objective is to 
acquire as comprehensive a picture as possible using a data set which is representative 
both in terms of its time dimension and the size of the firms.  
The empirical analysis I conducted was based on the most comprehensive set of 
annual financial statements available to researchers: the Bundesbank’s corporate 
balance sheet statistics. The study analysed more than 100,000 firms during the 1971-
2002 observation period. The descriptive analysis shows that, during the observation 
period, around two-thirds of the firms posted a loss in at least one year or carried 
forward a loss at least once. The duration and amount of the losses vary according to the 
size of the firm – large firms tend to have higher losses over a longer period. A marked 
rise in losses and loss carryforwards since the 1990s is apparent. Graham's expected 
marginal tax rates, which are calculated to allow for losses and loss carryforwards, 
indicate only comparatively minor differences between the enterprise size categories. 
However, the average marginal tax rate based on Graham's approach is far less than the 
income tax rate. 
The multivariate analysis showed that the reduced form (ADL) model for the 
marginal tax rate produced plausible results. The estimated elasticity level is between 
0.1 and 0.2. Therefore, a 10% cut in the marginal tax rate would entail an average 
increase of one to two percent in the propensity to invest. Note that this assumes an 
average overall effect which is dependent on changes to the tax rate and/or the offsetting 
of losses. The present methodology does not permit a breakdown into effects caused by 
the tax rate and those caused by the offsetting of losses. Note also that the firms are 
especially heterogeneous, which can precipitate various effects regarding expected 
investment activity. The more structural error correction model finds that the marginal 
tax rate is not suited to offering a plausible explanation of investment behaviour. One 
reason may be that the model has a less flexible structure which cannot adequately map 
the highly heterogeneous data.   102
The substantial result of this paper are the significant elasticities which are 
comparatively small. Against the background of the used fixed effects methods this is 
not surprising. The major tax effects will be absorbed by the fixed time effects. The 
results are only driven by the expected firm profitaability. In a model which combines 
the Graham marginal tax rates and EATR or EMTR the elasticities will become higher. 
The Graham marginal tax rates prove suitable in an ADL model. However, there 
are also drawbacks with this method. One particular Achilles’ heel is that the 
depreciation allowances are disregarded. Nor does the calculation method include 
different forms of financing or potential interest-rate effects. For this reason, the method 
is better viewed as an additional source of information for an empirical analysis; it 
certainly has its place alongside the more well-known methods used for calculating 
effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) and effective average tax rates (EATR).  
Future researchers would be well advised to compare and combine various 
methods for calculating the marginal tax rates side-by-side in a single data set. A 
comparison of the methods used to calculate the effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) 
and effective average tax rates (EATR) would be especially interesting. Such studies 
would contribute to our understanding of how marginal tax rates affect investment 
behaviour. 
6 References 
Arellano, M., 2003. Panel Data Econometrics – Advanced Texts in Econometrics. 
Oxford University Press.  
Bean, C.R., 1981. An Econometric Model of Manufacturing Investments in the UK. 
Economic Journal, 58, 106-121. 
Bond, S. and J. Van Reenen, 2003. Microeconometric Models of Investment and 
Employment. The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, Mimeo. 
Chirinko, R.S., S.M. Fazzari and A.P. Meyer, 1999. How Responsive is Business 
Capital Formation to its User Costs? An Exploration with Micro-Data. Journal of 
Public Economics, 74, 53-80. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005. German enterprises’ profitability and financing – an 
analysis based on a new dataset. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, October 
2005, 31-67. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2004. How the Bundesbank analyses enterprises’ 
creditworthiness. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, September 2004, 59-72.   103 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003. The economic situation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Germany. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, October 2003,  
29-53. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998. The methodological basis of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s 
corporate balance sheet statistics. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, October 
1998, 49-64. 
Devereux, M.P., 1989. Tax Asymmetries, the Cost of Capital and Investment, Economic 
Journal, 99, 103-112. 
Devereux, M.P., 2004. Measuring taxes on income from capital. In: P.B. Sorensen (ed.). 
Measuring the Tax Burden on Capital and Labour, Cambridge, USA: MIT Press, 
35-71. 
Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith, 2003. Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Decisions, 
International Tax and Public Finance 10, 107–126. 
Devereux, M.P., R. Griffith and A. Klemm, 2002. Corporate Income Tax Reforms and 
International Tax Competition. Economic Policy, 451-495. 
European Commission, 2003. Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, Official Journal, L 124 dated 20 May 2003 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:124:0036:0041:EN:PD
F  
Gordon, R.H., L. Kalambokidis and J. Slemrod, 2004. A New Summary Measure of the 
Effective Tax Rate on Investment. In P.B. Sorensen (ed.). Measuring the Tax 
Burden on Capital and Labor. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. 
Graham, J.R., 2003. Taxes and Corporate Finance. The Review of Financial Studies, 
Vol. 16, No. 4, 1075-1129. 
Graham, J.R., 1996a. Debt and the Marginal Tax Rate. Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 41, 41-73. 
Graham, J.R., 1996b. Proxies for the Corporate Marginal Tax Rate. Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 42, 187-221. 
Graham, J.R. and M.L. Lemmon, 1998. Measuring Corporate Tax Rates and Tax 
Incentives: A New Approach. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 11.1, 
54-65. 
Graham, J.R., M.L. Lemmon and J.S. Schaller, 1998. Debt, Leases, Taxes, and the 
Endogeneity of Corporate Tax Status. Journal of Finance, Vol. LIII, No. 1,   
131-162. 
Harhoff, D. and F. Ramb, 2001. Investment and Taxation in Germany — Evidence from 
Firm-Level Panel Data. In: Deutsche Bundesbank (Eds.): Investing Today for the 
World of Tomorrow – Studies on the Investment Process in Europe, Springer, 
Heidelberg, 47-84. 
Homburg, S., 2005. Allgemeine Steuerlehre, München: Vahlen. 
Keen, M., 2002. The German Tax Reform of 2000. International Tax and Public 
Finance, 9, 603-621.   104
Kiviet, J.F. and G.D.A. Phillips, 1993. Alternative Bias Approximations in Regressions 
with a Lagged Dependent Variable. Econometric Theory 9, 62-80. 
Shevlin, T., 1990. Estimating Corporate Marginal Tax rates with Asymmetric Tax 
Treatment of Gains and Losses. The Journal of the American Taxation 
Association, 12, 51-66. 
Sinn, H.W., 1987. Capital Income Taxation and Resource Allocation. North Holland: 
Amsterdam etc. 
Stöss, E., 2001. Deutsche Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet statistics and areas of 
application. Schmollers Jahrbuch – Journal of Applied Social Science Series, 121, 
131-137. 
Weichenrieder, A.J., 1995. Besteuerung und Direktinvestition (Taxation and foreign 
direct investment). Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck).   105 
 
Lebenslauf 
Persönliche Daten 
Name  Ramb 
Vorname  Fred 
Geburtsdatum/-ort  5. Mai 1966 in Wadern 
Staatsangehörigkeit  Deutsch 
Familienstand  Ledig 
Berufserfahrung 
Seit 09.2006  Nationaler Sachverständiger bei der Europäischen 
Kommission, DG Eurostat in Luxemburg, Abteilung Arbeits-
markt im Bereich Beschäftigung und Arbeitslosigkeit.  
06.2002 – 09.2006  Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Deutschen Bundesbank, 
Abteilung Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
04.2006 und 12.2005  Gastforscher an der University of North Carolina, Kenan-
Flegler Business School, Chapel Hill (USA). 
04.2001 – 05.2002  Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Abteilung Ökonometrie, Frankfurt am Main. 
09.1999 – 04.2000 
10.2000 – 12.2000 
Forschungsaufenthalt in der Volkswirtschaftlichen 
Forschungsgruppe der Deutschen Bundesbank, Frankfurt am 
Main.  
01.1996 – 03.2001  Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) im Forschungsbereich 
Unternehmensbesteuerung und Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft, 
Mannheim.  
Studium 
10.2004 – 09.2006  Promotionsstudium an der Professur für Finanzwissenschaft – 
Prof. Dr. Alfons J. Weichenrieder – an der Goethe-Universität 
Frankfurt am Main.  
Thema: „Empirische Analysen zur Unternehmensbesteuerung 
(Empirical analysis on corporate taxation)“ 
10.1987 – 07.1995  Studium der Wirtschaftswissenschaften an der Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt am Main mit den Studienschwerpunkten 
Ökonometrie, Geld und Währung sowie Bankbetriebslehre.  
Examen zum Diplom-Volkswirt mit der Gesamtnote Gut. 
Schulbildung 
08.1972 – 06.1985  Grundschule, Realschule und Gymnasium in Frankfurt am 
Main 
   106
 
„Ich habe die vorgelegte Dissertation selbst verfasst und dabei nur die von mir 
angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt. Alle Textstellen, die wörtlich oder 
sinngemäß aus veröffentlichten oder nicht veröffentlichten Schriften entnommen sind 
sowie alle Angaben, die auf mündlichen Auskünften beruhen, sind als solche kenntlich 
gemacht.“ 
 